Re-Reading Legal Realism and Tracing a Genealogy of Balancing by Nyquist, Curtis
Buffalo Law Review 
Volume 65 Number 4 Article 3 
8-1-2017 
Re-Reading Legal Realism and Tracing a Genealogy of Balancing 
Curtis Nyquist 
New England Law | Boston 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.buffalo.edu/buffalolawreview 
 Part of the Law and Society Commons, and the Legal Theory Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Curtis Nyquist, Re-Reading Legal Realism and Tracing a Genealogy of Balancing, 65 Buff. L. Rev. 771 
(2017). 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.buffalo.edu/buffalolawreview/vol65/iss4/3 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at Digital Commons @ University at 
Buffalo School of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Buffalo Law Review by an authorized editor of Digital 
Commons @ University at Buffalo School of Law. For more information, please contact lawscholar@buffalo.edu. 
  
  
   
  
             
        
         
         
      
        
   
 
         
         
           
        
 
        
          
     
               
        
             
         
         
      
   
 
            
            
            
 
            
       
          
 
          
 
Re-Reading Legal Realism and Tracing a 
Genealogy of Balancing
CURTIS NYQUIST†
For it is not difficult to show that the legal order has always
been and is a system of compromises between conflicting and
overlapping human claims or wants or desires in which the 
continual pressure of these claims and of the claims involved in
civilized social life has compelled lawmakers and judges and
administrators to seek to satisfy the most they might with the
least sacrifice.—Roscoe Pound1 
Dean Pound has talked for many years of the “balancing” of
interests, but without ever indicating which interests are more
important than others or how a standard of weight or fineness can
be constructed for the appraisal of “interests.”—Felix S. Cohen2 
Genealogy is gray, meticulous, and patiently documentary. It 
operates on a field of entangled and confused parchments, on
documents that have been scratched over and recopied many
times. On this basis, it is obvious that Paul Ree was wrong . . . in
describing the history of morality in terms of a linear
development . . . . He assumed that words had kept their meaning,
that desires still pointed in a single direction, and that ideas
retained their logic; and he ignored the fact that the world of
speech and desires has known invasions, struggles, plundering,
disguises, ploys.—Michel Foucault3 
† Professor Emeritus, New England Law | Boston. Many thanks to New
England Law | Boston for a sabbatical leave and to Peter Karol, Gary
Monserud, and Bill Turpie for their comments. Any remaining errors are mine
alone.
1. Roscoe Pound, The Theory of Judicial Decision (III): A Theory of Judicial 
Decision for Today, 36 HARV. L. REV. 940, 954-55 (1923).
2. Felix S. Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 
35 COLUM. L. REV. 809, 848 (1935).
3. MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE FOUCAULT READER 76, 76 (Paul Rabinow ed.,
1984).
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772 BUFFALO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 65
INTRODUCTION
The conventional history of American legal thought
conflates the Progressive movement and Legal Realism. In 
this well-worn account, the progressives mounted the first
critique of Classical Legal Thought (CLT)4 with the 
Supreme Court case Lochner v. New York5 as the triggering
event6 and the second wave of critique by the realists in the 
1920’s and 30’s brought the formalist era to a close. Any
differences between the progressives and realists are seen
as minor compared with their joint effort in undermining
CLT. And yet, there is a feeling of uneasiness about our
understanding of realism. For example, one history both
states confidently that realism should “be regarded as the 
continuation of a particular trend—namely, the growing
dissatisfaction with legal formalism—rather than as the
beginning of something substantially new,”7 but adds a 
hesitant note, “[r]ealism, quite simply, remains as elusive 
as it has been influential.”8 
4. For the origins of the term Classical Legal Thought to describe the era
beginning in the mid-nineteenth century and extending into the twentieth 
century, see DUNCAN KENNEDY, THE RISE AND FALL OF CLASSICAL LEGAL
THOUGHT, at vii–viii, xxxi (2006).
5. 198 U.S. 45 (1905). In Lochner, the Supreme Court struck down a New
York statute as an unconstitutional infringement of employers’ contract rights.
Id. at 64. The statute had limited the number of hours employees could work in 
bakeries and confectionaries. Id. at 53.
6. E.g., MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW
1870–1960: THE CRISIS OF LEGAL ORTHODOXY 3 (1992).
7. NEIL DUXBURY, PATTERNS OF AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE 77 (1995). For
other instances of conflation, see WILLIAM W. FISHER III, MORTON J. HORWITZ & 
THOMAS A. REED, AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM, at xiii–xiv (William W. Fisher III,
Mortno J. Horwitz & Thomas A. Reed eds., 1993) (“The heart of the [Legal
Realism] movement was an effort to define and discredit classical legal theory
and practice and to offer in their place a more philosophically and politically 
enlightened jurisprudence.”); HORWITZ, supra note 6, at 171 (“both intellectual
movements [Progressive jurisprudence and Legal Realism] should be
understood as subcategories of pre- and post- World War I Progressive legal
thought, and Legal Realism needs to be seen primarily as a continuation of the
reformist attack on orthodox legal thought.”).
8. DUXBURY, supra note 7, at 65.
    
       
       
       
      
       
       
   
       
         
 
      
     
        
        
      
       
         
       
     
     
         
 
              
           
          
            
     
               
         
          
           
            
          
       
        
       
           
     
         
         
       
7732017] GENEALOGY OF BALANCING
This Article argues that the standard reading of Legal
Realism is seriously flawed and a source of endless
confusion in contemporary legal thought. Many academics
who view themselves as heirs of the realists because of their
anti-formalism are in fact modern day progressives, having
missed the main points of realism. Legal realism was
primarily a critique of progressive thought.9 Of course the 
realists continued to assail formalism, but what makes
their work interesting and important is their attack on the 
progressives.
Potential sources of our misreading of legal realism
include its premature end10 and the ongoing debate about
who qualifies as a realist. This debate dates to early days
with Karl Llewellyn’s 1931 publication of a list of twenty
realists and his remark, “[t]here are doubtless twenty
more.”11 Any attempt to generate a list of realists leads to 
odd results. For example, Lon Fuller, who would not be on
anyone’s list, has been called the author of “perhaps the 
single most influential piece of Realist doctrinal work.”12 
This Article abandons the effort to decide who should be 
included in or excluded from the list of legal realists and
9. The source of this idea is found in Duncan Kennedy, Two Globalizations
of Law & Legal Thought: 1850–1968, 36 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 631, 636 (2003) (“I
depart from current fashion by treating legal realism as the critical devastation 
of sociological jurisprudence . . . rather than as ‘essentially’ an extension of the
sociological jurisprudes’ critique of CLT.”).
10. Legal Realism was in full retreat by the late 1930’s. See Curtis Nyquist,
Llewellyn’s Code as a Reflection of Legal Consciousness, 40 NEW ENG. L. REV. 
419, 421 (2006). Karl Llewellyn, after publishing six realist contract articles in
the 1930’s, abandoned his more radical thought and turned his attention to
production of the Uniform Commercial Code. Id. For a summary of the reasons
underlying the decline of realism, see DUNCAN KENNEDY, A CRITIQUE OF
ADJUDICATION 323 (1997) (discussing the twin threats of fascism and Stalinism,
and the realists forgoing critique “in favor of the more pressing task of
managing the new liberal, regulatory, interventionist state.”).
11. Karl N. Llewellyn, Some Realism About Realism—Responding to Dean
Pound, 44 HARV. L. REV. 1222, 1226–27 n.18 (1931). For a discussion of the
exchange between Llewellyn and Pound about the list of realists, see N.E.H.
HULL, ROSCOE POUND AND KARL LLEWELLYN 202–18, app. at 343–46 (1997).
12. HORWITZ, supra note 6, at 184.
      
       
      
          
    
      
      
       
         
      
     
         
      
        
      
       
      
     
         
       
      
      
     
       
        
       
      
 
              
             
      
                
    
           
             
  
         
        
              
      
774 BUFFALO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 65
reframes our understanding of legal realism. It divides the 
early twentieth century into two eras; a Progressive Era
from 1905 to 1923 and a Realist Era from 1923 to 1941.
While the dates are somewhat arbitrary and there are 
precursors, remnants, and significant overlap,13 the legal
thought of these two eras display stark differences and the 
world of the Realist Era was dramatically different from the 
Progressive Era. Lochner was decided in 1905 and in that
same year, Roscoe Pound published Do We Need a
Philosophy of Law? the first of his path-breaking pre-World
War I articles.14 The year 1923 was a pivotal transitional
moment. Benjamin Cardozo’s The Nature of the Judicial 
Process15 published in 1921 seemed a full flowering of 
Progressive Era thought, but trouble lurked on the horizon.
In 1922 a French lawyer Pierre Lepaulle published a
devastating critique of Pound in the Harvard Law Review,
declaring, “[s]ociological jurisprudence, like all human
creations, is not a permanent thing: it may represent the 
best forces of the present generation; it will certainly
dissatisfy the next.”16 His prophecy would come true,
perhaps more quickly than he realized, in the following
year when Underhill Moore published Rational Basis of 
Legal Institutions17 signaling a profound turn in legal
thought. The years 1923 to 1941 would witness a rich
flowering of legal thought unprecedented in our history.
The publication in 1941 of Lon Fuller’s Consideration and 
13. For discussion of Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. as a precursor of the
Realist Era and Roscoe Pound as a Progressive Era remnant, see infra notes
333–35, 413–20, 391, 428, 475, 510 and accompanying text.
14. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905); Roscoe Pound, Do We Need a
Philosophy of Law?, 5 COLUM. L. REV. 339 (1905).
15. BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS (1921).
16. Pierre Lepaulle, The Function of Comparative Law with a Critique of
Sociological Jurisprudence, 35 HARV. L. REV. 838, 850 (1922).
17. Underhill Moore, Rational Basis of Legal Institutions, 23 COLUM. L. REV. 
609, 612 (1923) (“Human experience discloses no ultimates. Events are related 
to events so that each is at once an end and a means. Ultimates are phantoms
drifting upon the stream of day dreams.”).
    
      
    
      
       
       
      
         
      
       
       
      
       
      
        
         
   
     
     
     
    
         
     
         
     
      
      
       
 
        
          
        
 
           
               
           
               
  
             
      
7752017] GENEALOGY OF BALANCING
Form18 brought the Realist Era to a close.
Furthermore, in the Realist Era, balancing, which has 
become the “default method of legal reasoning in Western
legal systems,”19 both moves to center stage and begins to 
divide. There is a teleological view of balancing, dominant
in the Progressive Era and still the prevailing approach,
and an attack on teleological balancing, which this Article
calls “conflicting considerations.” Unfortunately, both sides
used a single term “balancing” and the parchments of the
Realist Era are “entangled and confused” as balancing
unravels as a unitary concept. Exposing the double 
meaning of balancing requires a close reading of Realist Era
scholarship. Furthermore, the most striking work in the 
Realist Era displays a cognitive relativism, not found in the 
legal thought of any prior era. This relativism was central
to the rise of conflicting considerations balancing. Our 
failure to recognize a link between a conflicting
considerations concept of balancing and cognitive relativism
creates the false hope that balancing provides a
determinate method of resolving legal disputes.20 
Part I of this Article provides a quick summary of CLT,
its critique in the Progressive Era, and the progressive’s
proposals for reconstruction of legal thought. Part II is a
close re-reading of the literature from the Realist Era in
support of the argument that the principal target was the 
Progressive Era.21 Part III traces the genealogy of our
ambiguous view of balancing and connects this genealogy
18. Lon L. Fuller, Consideration and Form, 41 COLUM. L. REV. 799 (1941).
19. DUNCAN KENNEDY, Thought on Coherence, Social, Values, and National
Tradition in Private Law, in LEGAL REASONING: COLLECTED ESSAYS 175, 186 
(2008).
20. See id. at 189 (“The weakness of proportionality [balancing] from my
point of view is not that it is unprincipled, but that it is excessively principled.
The universalization requirement for principles . . . impose[s] restrictions on the
judge that I think he should be ready to discard when they conflict with his
intuition of justice”).
21. Part II of this Article relies on original sources while secondary
literature is generally relegated to footnotes.
      
      
   
          
            
                
              
             
              
        
         
          
         
 
   
        
       
       
        
     
      
      
        
    
         
     
       
       
       
 
            
  
 23.  KENNEDY, supra note 4, at xi. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. 
776 BUFFALO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 65
with the Realist Era critique of the Progressive Era. Part IV
is a conclusion.
I. CLASSICAL LEGAL THOUGHT AND THE PROGRESSIVE ERA 
A. Classical Legal Thought 
Law, considered as a science, consists of certain principles or
doctrines . . . . Each of these doctrines has arrived at its present
state by slow degrees . . . [t]his growth is to be traced in the main
through a series of cases [but] . . . [t]he vast majority are useless
and worse than useless for any purpose of systematic study . . . . It 
seemed to me, therefore, to be possible to take such a branch of the
law as Contracts, for example, and without exceeding
comparatively moderate limits, to select, classify, and arrange all
the cases which had contributed in any important degree to the
growth, development, or establishment of any of its essential
doctrines.22 
The rise of CLT in the second half of the nineteenth
century created a sharp break with pre-classical thought
and completely reordered the judicial universe.23 Public law
was separated from private law with the will theory
providing a high level, abstract ordering principle.24 Public
law reflected the will of the state while private law reflected
the will of the individual and the “key image was of powers
and rights that were ‘absolute within their spheres.’”25 In 
Lochner, for instance, both the majority and the dissent by
Justice Harlan share an understanding that the state of 
New York has a “public” police power to protect health and
safety while employers have a Fourteenth Amendment
“private” right to freely contract with their employees. In 
their view, the court’s role is limited to policing the border
between public and private to insure each party acts only
22. C.C. LANGDELL, A SELECTION OF CASES ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS, at vi– 
vii (1871).
    
         
     
      
    
      
      
      
          
      
       
      
     
        
        
         
     
      
    
       
        
      
    
       
      
       
     
        
 
            
    
       
           
  
    
     
     
      
             
7772017] GENEALOGY OF BALANCING
within its own sphere. New York, it determined, had
invaded the employers’ sphere. Under CLT judges were 
“commit[ed] to finding a determinate legal actor to obey, a
refusal to interject himself or to arbitrate.”26 
Furthermore, CLT viewed law as a science of legal
categories with nineteenth century geometry being the 
closest analogy.27 Within private law, private law subjects
were seen as not only distinct from public law, but also as
separate from each other with courts policing the 
boundaries between contract, tort, restitution, and other
private law subjects. Decisions like Britton v. Turner,28 an 
opinion from the first half of the nineteenth century,
disappear from the reports. Britton awarded $95 to a farm
laborer who had been working under a one-year contract.29 
He was to be paid $120 at the end of the year, but left his
employment after nine and one-half months.30 The court
pondered the policy consequences of its decision and
allowed the plaintiff to recover in quantum meruit—the 
award “will leave no temptation . . . to drive the laborer
from his service, near the close of his term.”31 In addition,
the court pointed out that if the plaintiff had breached the 
contract before performance was to begin, the defendant’s
damages would have been negligible. Therefore, a judgment
for the defendant would have an odd consequence: “the 
party who attempts performance may be placed in a much
worse situation than he who wholly disregards his
contract.”32 Under CLT, Britton would be categorized as a
26. Id. at 209. For an extensive discussion of Lochner as a reflection of CLT,
see id. at 8–16.
27. Thomas C. Grey, Langdell’s Orthodoxy, 45 U. PITT. L. REV. 1, 16–20 
(1983); Curtis Nyquist, Single-Case Research and the History of American Legal
Thought, 45 NEW ENG. L. REV. 589, 591 (2011).
28. 6 N.H. 481 (1834).
29. Id. at 483.
30. Id. at 482.
31. Id. at 486–87, 494.
32. Id. at 487. To illustrate the court’s point, had the laborer never shown 
      
       
      
      
      
   
        
    
     
      
       
       
        
       
      
      
      
 
         
         
            
          
     
             
      
      
       
          
     
         
           
            
           
      
   
               
      
         
          
      
     
778 BUFFALO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 65
case in contract, not restitution—in contract, a party who 
breaches is not allowed to recover. The categorical scheme 
constructed by CLT would demand judgment for the 
defendant and instruct a court to ignore the policy
consequences of the particular result.33 
This Article focuses on contract, which was considered
the core of CLT. Important markers were the introduction
of the case method in Langdell’s contract course (fall of 
1870),34 Langdell’s “guide” to his contract casebook
published as an appendix to the second edition (1880),35 
Oliver Wendell Holmes’s lectures The Common Law
(delivered in the fall of 1880 and published in 1881),36 and 
Samuel Williston’s casebook and scholarship in contract
and sale of goods.37 Thomas Grey summarizes the goal of 
CLT as for “the legal system [to] be made complete through
universal formality, and universally formal through
up he would have been liable for the difference between the contract price and 
the market price (or the cost of hiring a substitute). That amount likely would
have been just a few dollars or $0. In the actual case he works nine and one-half
months, foregoing alternative employment. Id. Had the court not awarded
damages he would have lost $95.
33. Grey, supra note 27, at 15 (discussing how policy under CLT was
relevant in establishing high level principles, but should not be used in 
determining particular rules or deciding cases).
34. LANGDELL, supra note 22, at v–vii.
35. C.C. LANGDELL, A SUMMARY OF THE LAW OF CONTRACTS, app. at 255–77 
(photo. reprint 1980) (2d ed. 1880).
36. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 3, 195–264 (Mark DeWolfe
Howe ed., Belknap Press 1963) (1881). Holmes participated both in the
construction of CLT and in its demolition. The Common Law was his principal
work of construction while Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., Privilege, Malice, and
Intent, 8 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1894) [hereinafter Holmes, Privilege] signaled his 
turn toward critique.
37. Williston was on the faculty at Harvard Law School from 1890 to 1938
and published extensively in contract and sale of goods throughout this period.
SAMUEL WILLISTON, LIFE AND LAW: AN AUTOBIOGRAPHY 183, 264, 265, 266, 334 
(1941). In Grant Gilmore’s view, Williston’s contribution to CLT provided
“meticulous, although not always accurate, scholarly detail.” GRANT GILMORE, 
THE DEATH OF CONTRACT 15 (1995).
    
     
       
       
      
      
        
       
     
      
         
     
     
        
     
         
        
    
        
        
      
      
        
      
     
 
        
      
   
     
          
          
             
             
         
            
             
          
 
              
7792017] GENEALOGY OF BALANCING
conceptual order.”38 CLT’s science of legal categories
combined induction and deduction.39 From the core cases in
a field of study, the legal scientist would induce the high
level principles that were central to the field.40 From these 
principles the scientist would then deduce the lower-level
rules to be applied by courts.41 In contract, for example, one 
of the core cases was Mills v. Wyman, which helped
establish the bargain theory of consideration.42 From the 
bargain theory, numerous particular rules were thought to 
follow as a matter of logic: offers could be revoked unless
there was some consideration to hold the offer open;
reliance and benefit were insufficient grounds for promise 
enforcement unless they had been bargained for; in
negotiating contracts, parties could do or say anything 
short of lying, without liability, as long as they refrained
from issuing or accepting an offer; and so on.43 
By the late nineteenth century, CLT had become the 
dominant system of thought for lawyers, judges, and law
faculty. It derived much of its power through its linkage 
with laissez faire classical economics, utilitarian philosophy,
and the “survival of the fittest” social theory of Herbert
Spencer. In a 1926 retrospective on the era, John Maynard
Keynes captured the power of this interlocking system, “[t]o 
the philosophical doctrine that Government has no right to 
38. Grey, supra note 27, at 11.
39. Id. at 40.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 40.
42. 20 Mass. (3 Pick.) 207 (1825). In Mills, the plaintiff cared for the
defendant’s son who had fallen ill. Id. After the son’s death, the defendant
learned of the plaintiff’s action and promised to pay his expenses. Id. at 209.
When the defendant failed to perform the plaintiff sued for breach of contract.
Id. at 207. The opinion held the promise unenforceable and explained that since
the act was performed prior to the promise, it could not be consideration. Id. at
209, 212. For further discussion of Mills see Nyquist, supra note 27, at 610–16;
Geoffrey R. Watson, In the Tribunal of Conscience: Mills v. Wyman
Reconsidered, 71 TUL. L. REV. 1749 (1997).
43. GILMORE, supra note 37, at 21–24, 36; Nyquist, supra note 27, at 596.
      
      
       
  
            
           
         
          
        
           
       
   
     
      
     
       
       
      
    
     
     
     
      
        
       
 
           
           
          
          
 
          
   
      
            
       
780 BUFFALO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 65
interfere, and the divine miracle that it has no need to 
interfere, there is added a scientific proof that its
interference is inexpedient.”44 
B. The Progressive Era 
For nearly a generation the leaders of the bar with few exceptions
have not only failed to take part in any constructive legislation
designed to solve in the interest of the people our great social,
economic and industrial problems, but they have failed likewise to
oppose legislation prompted by selfish interests. They have often
gone further in disregard of public interest. They have, at times,
advocated as lawyers legislative measures which as citizens they 
could not approve.45 
The consequences for society of CLT and nineteenth
century thought were generally apparent by the turn of the 
twentieth century—industrial strife, the urban poor,
unprotected immigrant communities, child labor, and an
unsafe food supply, to name but a few. Efforts to address
these ills started piecemeal but soon coalesced into the 
progressive movement. Jane Addams founded Hull House 
in 188946—the first of nineteen urban settlement houses
providing a wide variety of services to immigrant
communities including education, housing, and
employment.47 In 1889, John Dewey published The School 
and Society, calling for reforms in education.48 “Dewey’s
school was to be socially minded,” observes Morton White,
44. JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES, THE END OF LAISSEZ FAIRE 11 (1926), quoted in
P.S. ATIYAH, THE RISE AND FALL OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT, 305 (1979).
45. Louis D. Brandeis, The Opportunity in the Law, 39 AM. L. REV. 555, 
560–61 (1905), quoted in MELVIN I. UROFSKY, LOUIS D. BRANDEIS: A LIFE 204
(2009).
46. LOUISE W. KNIGHT, CITIZEN: JANE ADDAMS AND THE STRUGGLE FOR
DEMOCRACY 179, 198 (2005).
47. See id. at 274–75.
48. JOHN DEWEY, THE SCHOOL AND SOCIETY (1899), reprinted in 1 JOHN
DEWEY: THE MIDDLE WORKS, 1899–1924, at 5 (Jo Ann Boydston ed., 1976).
    
       
     
      
      
     
     
  
        
     
    
        
        
        
        
      
     
      
     
 
 
         
  
     
            
      
           
            
      
          
          
         
        
         
   
        
            
    
7812017] GENEALOGY OF BALANCING
“imbued with the values of community life.”49 In the 1890’s,
intellectuals in a wide range of disciplines including
philosophy, economics, and political science “had been
convinced that logic, abstraction, deduction, mathematics
and mechanics were inadequate to social research and
incapable of containing the rich, moving, living current of 
social life.”50 
The attack on formalism in law arrived relatively late.
Central figures in the Progressive Era critique of CLT and
proposals for reconstruction include Roscoe Pound (of
particular note, four law review articles published between
1905 and 1909),51 Louis Brandeis (litigation strategy first
deployed in Muller v. Oregon),52 Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld
(two-part law review article published in 1913 and 1917),53 
and Benjamin Cardozo, whose judicial philosophy as
expressed in the Nature of the Judicial Process54 and 
reflected in his opinions over twenty-five years55 
established him as the primary judicial figure of the 
progressive movement.
49. MORTON WHITE, SOCIAL THOUGHT IN AMERICA: THE REVOLT AGAINST
FORMALISM 97 (1949).
50. Id. at 11.
51. Pound was incredibly prolific throughout his career. Between 1905 and
1909 he published thirty-nine articles, addresses, reviews, editorials, and 
reports. See FRANKLYN C. SERATO, A BIBLIOGRAPHY OF THE WRITINGS OF ROSCOE
POUND 5–8, 56–8 (1942). This Article focuses on the four articles that would
become the core of Progressive Era thought.
52. See Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412, 415–16 (1908).
53. Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied
in Judicial Reasoning, 26 YALE L.J. 710 (1917) [hereinafter Hohfeld, Judicial
Reasoning]; Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions
as Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 23 YALE L.J. 16 (1913) [hereinafter Hohfeld,
Fundamental Legal Conceptions].
54. See CARDOZO, supra note 15, at 9.
55. For a description of Cardozo’s years on the bench, see generally ANDREW
L. KAUFMAN, CARDOZO 117–45, 491–565 (1998).
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782 BUFFALO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 65
Pound’s scholarship introduced the themes that would
frame the Progressive Era. He published Do We Need a
Philosophy of Law56 in May of 1905, a month after the 
decision in Lochner was announced.57 Pound’s article does
not mention Lochner—presumably in April the article’s
publication process was well underway—but the decision
galvanized support for Pound’s ideas. Do We Need contains
both a critique of CLT and a proposal for reconstruction.
This critique/reconstruction structure, while not a Pound
innovation, was deployed in all of his scholarship from the 
Progressive Era and has become embedded in post-CLT 
scholarship.58 His critique focuses on the common law
which “for the first time . . . finds itself arrayed against the 
people.”59 It exhibits “too great a respect for the 
56. Pound, supra note 14. Pound had been appointed Dean of the University
of Nebraska College of Law in 1903, but his ultimate goal was joining the 
faculty at Harvard Law School where he had been a student for the 1889–90 
academic year. See DAVID WIGDORE, ROSCOE POUND: PHILOSOPHER OF LAW 46,
103 (1974). In 1890 he had returned to read law in his father’s firm in Lincoln,
Nebraska and was admitted to the bar the same year. See HULL, supra note 11,
at 40. Pound served as dean at Nebraska for four years, was a faculty member
at law schools in Chicago for three years (two years at Northwestern and one at
the University of Chicago) and then joined the Harvard law School faculty in
the fall of 1910. See WIGDORE, supra, at 130; HULL, supra note 11, at 72, 76–77.
He became dean at Harvard in 1916. See WIGDORE, supra, at 204. For
discussions of the pre-1910 period in Pound’s life, see generally id. at 31–159;
HULL, supra note 11, at 36–75.
57. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905); DAVID E. BERNSTEIN, 
REHABILITATING LOCHNER 33 (2011).
58. Duncan Kennedy provides a summary of the scholarship legacy of the
Progressive Era:
They often invented critical techniques as part of ground-clearing
operations for their “reconstructive” efforts . . . To this day, their
posterity includes the scholar who develops an elaborate critique of
earlier attempts to rationalize a field, and then offers his or her own
alternative. The alternative sinks without a stone, but the critique not
only effectively does in its object but survives as a model for future
destructive operations.
KENNEDY, supra note 10, at 82.
59. Pound, supra note 14, at 344.
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individual”60 and “too little respect for the needs of 
society.”61 He enumerates nineteen state court decisions
striking down employee protectionist legislation on the 
grounds of unconstitutional infringement of freedom of 
contract.62 Some particularly egregious results nullified
statutes fixing pay periods, prohibiting fines in cotton mills,
prohibiting wage deductions to establish hospital and relief 
funds, regulating the measurement of coal in determining
wages, and prohibiting payment of wages in store orders.63 
The common law “knows individuals only” treating
questions of the “highest social import as mere private 
controversies between John Doe and Richard Roe.”64 Pound
has little to offer by way of a remedy other than a
suggestion that law schools train students in the “social,
political and legal philosophy abreast of our time.”65 
The Need of a Sociological Jurisprudence66 from 1907
continues the critique of the common law’s application of 
individual standards “in the teeth of the collective standard
which is or ought to be expressed in the law,”67 while 
Pound’s ideas for reconstruction are more fully developed.
He also provides a name, “Sociological Jurisprudence,” 
which would become a catch-phrase in the Progressive 
60. Id.
61. See id. at 344–45.
62. See id.
63. See id. at 345.
64. Id. at 346.
65. Id. at 352. Pound had been a transformational dean at Nebraska but the
same cannot be said for his deanship at Harvard. See WIGDORE, supra note 56,
at 108–10. In stark contrast to teaching and curricular innovations at
Columbia, Yale, and Johns Hopkins in the 1920’s and 30’s, there were no
significant changes to the Harvard curriculum or teaching methods during
Pound’s twenty years (1916–36) as dean. See id. at 251–54. For details of
Pound’s deanships, see generally id. at 103–31, 234–40, 244–54; HULL, supra
note 11, at 51–55, 117–24, 160–66.
66. Roscoe Pound, The Need of a Sociological Jurisprudence, 19 GREEN BAG
607 (1907).
67. Id. at 607.
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Era.68 He points to Continental Europe where “the 
sociological tendency, is already well-marked”69 and calls 
for “a scientific apprehension of the relations of law to
society and of the needs and interests and opinions of 
society of to-day.”70 In other words, law should be based on
the study of social conditions,71 and should be “in the hands
of a progressive and enlightened caste whose conceptions 
are in advance of the public and whose leadership is
bringing popular thought to a higher level.”72 Pound finds
some signs of progress, citing legislation imposing
obligations on “classes of persons and classes of subjects”73 
as making inroads on freedom of contract and pointing out
that even the common law regards certain contracts (e.g., 
insurance) as specialized and, therefore, not subject to 
common law contract rules.74 
Pound’s Mechanical Jurisprudence75 from 1908 calls for
a new jurisprudence which will allow an escape from “the 
domination of the ghosts of departed masters”76:
The sociological movement in jurisprudence is a movement for
pragmatism as a philosophy of law; for the adjustment of
principles and doctrines to the human conditions they are to
govern rather than to assumed first principles; for putting the 
human factor in the central place and relegating logic to its true
68. Id.
69. Id. at 609.
70. Id. at 611.
71. Pound had become friends with University of Nebraska sociologist
Edward A. Ross and was profoundly affected by his work. See WIGDOR, supra
note 56, at 111–13; HULL, supra note 11, at 55–56. In 1906 he would write to
Ross, “I believe you have set me in the path the world is moving in.” WIGDOR, 
supra note 56, at 112. In Chicago, Pound was introduced to Jane Addams,
delivered lectures at Hull House, and served on its Juvenile Court Committee.
See HULL, supra note 11, at 72; WIGDOR, supra note 56, at 141.
72. Pound, supra note 66, at 612.
73. Id. at 613
74. See id.
75. Roscoe Pound, Mechanical Jurisprudence, 8 COLUM. L. REV. 605 (1908).
76. Id. at 606.
    
  
        
        
     
     
     
       
   
       
      
       
         
         
    
      
          
       
      
         
      
    
             
       
 
     
     
             
          
          
          
          
       
         
     
          
     
7852017] GENEALOGY OF BALANCING
position as an instrument.77 
Law must be judged by results, “not by the niceties of 
its internal structure.”78 Pound argues that courts cannot
provide solutions to the issues confronting society and that 
other institutions are better suited to the task.79 
Legislatures and administrative agencies can hold
hearings, commission studies, and sponsor conferences; and
bar associations have the expertise to propose procedural
reforms.80 Pound calls for common-law lawyers to abandon
their hostility to legislation, cites instances of jurists’
support of legislation in Roman Law and contemporary
Continental Europe, and concludes, “[i]t is only a lip service 
to our common law that would condemn it to a perpetuity of 
mechanical jurisprudence through distrust of legislation.”81 
Pound’s Liberty of Contract82 is his most sophisticated
and penetrating work from this pre-1910 period, both as a
critique and as a proposal for reconstruction. He attacks the 
“liberty of contract” principle on two fronts. First, he argues
the concept never existed in its pure form as equity has
always intervened to protect “weak, necessitous, or
unfortunate promisors.”83 The phrase is of recent origin; the 
first case using it as a basis for a decision is from 1886 and
there is no thorough discussion of it as a fundamental
77. Id. at 609–10.
78. Id. at 605.
79. See id. at 621–23. It is ironic that Mechanical Jurisprudence was
published in the same year Louis Brandeis filed his legendary brief in Muller v.
Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908). The 113 page brief contained two pages discussing
legal principles and about 100 pages of medical texts, factory reports, and other
sociological data. See UROFSKY, supra note 45, at 216. For further discussion of
the Brandeis Brief, see infra notes 108–18 and accompanying text.
80. See Pound, supra note 75, at 621–22.
81. Id. at 622–23.
82. Roscoe Pound, Liberty of Contract, 18 YALE L.J. 454 (1909).
83. Id. at 482.
      
      
      
     
        
      
     
       
      
      
      
         
      
        
   
              
            
         
           
        
        
          
       
        
      
   
    
     
       
       
 
          
     
    
     
         
   
     
786 BUFFALO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 65
natural right in the literature prior to 1891.84 In other
words, “liberty of contract” was an invention of the late 
nineteenth century created to defeat protectionist
legislation. Second, in many contracts there is in fact no 
equality of bargaining power. In industrial employment
contracts courts ignore conditions of inequality and “force 
upon legislation an academic theory of equality in the face 
of practical conditions of inequality.”85 In Adair v. United
States,86 for example, the Supreme Court struck down
federal legislation prohibiting employers in the railway
industry from requiring that employees not join a labor
union as a condition of employment.87 Pound’s article 
begins with a lengthy quote from the majority opinion in
Adair including the following:
So the right of the employee to quit the service of the employer, for
whatever reason, is the same as the right of the employer, for
whatever reason, to dispense with the services of such
employee . . . . In all such particulars the employer and employee
have equality of right, and any legislation that disturbs that
equality is an arbitrary interference with the liberty of contract,
which no government can legally justify in a free land.88 
Pound cites a sociologist who refers to any discussion of 
equal rights in these contracts as “utterly hollow” and he 
castigates the court for ignoring the “actual industrial
conditions” of such contracts.89 
In Liberty of Contract, Pound discusses the political
consequences of the common law’s distrust of legislation
which reflects the maxim, “government governs best which
governs least,”90 and he spells out its disastrous
84. Id. at 455 (citing Godcharles v. Wigeman, 6 A. 354 (Pa. 1886)).
85. Id. at 454.
86. 208 U.S. 161 (1908).
87. Id. at 179–80.
88. Pound, supra note 82, at 454 (quoting Adair, 208 U.S. at 174–75).
89. Id.
90. Id. at 462.
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consequences for society: lawlessness, industrial discord,
and loss of respect for courts.91 The judiciary is ill equipped
to address changes in society and Pound points to Supreme 
Court Justice Stephen J. Field as an illustration.92 Field
had a Puritan background and a career “upon the frontier
in the time and at the place where the individual counted
for more and the state-imposed law for less than at any
other period in our history.”93 No wonder, then, that courts
treat employment contracts “as if the parties were 
individuals—as if they were farmers haggling over the sale 
of a horse.”94 A study of the underlying conditions in New
York bakeries finding employees working “unreasonable 
hours under unsanitary conditions” demonstrated that “the 
legislature was right and the court [in Lochner] was
wrong.”95 Jurisprudence has been the last science to move 
“away from the method of deduction from predetermined
conceptions”96 and has “decay[ed] into technicality”
becoming a “mechanical jurisprudence.”97 CLT’s attempt to 
deduce legal rules from general principles has produced a
“cloud of rules that obscures the principles from which they
were drawn.”98 As a remedy, Pound repeats his earlier call
for a sociological movement in law, based on the study of 
91. Pound quotes Jane Addams, referring to her as “an acute and well-
informed observer:”
From my own experience, I should say, perhaps, that the one symptom
among workingmen which most definitely indicates a class feeling, is a 
growing distrust of the integrity of the courts, the belief that the
present judge has been a corporation attorney, that his sympathies and
experience and his whole view of life is on the corporation side.
Id. at 487.
92. Id. at 470.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 454.
95. Id. at 480.
96. Id. at 464.
97. Id. at 462.
98. Id. at 457.
      
       
         
  
  ii. Louis Brandeis
      
        
       
      
      
       
     
 
    
    
       
     
       
      
        
       
  
      
      
     
 
     
              
               
        
      
         
       
     
       
           
 
     
788 BUFFALO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 65
the underlying conditions leading to society’s ills and adds
that included in that movement is “pragmatism as a
philosophy of law.”99 
Louis Brandeis is a significant figure in the Progressive 
Era as a lawyer advocating in the public interest100 and 
through his numerous speeches and articles. His
appointment to the U.S. Supreme Court in 1916 installed
progressive thought on the court. “[H]is judicial opinions,”
comments Edward A. Purcell, Jr., “frequently articulated
the values of Progressivism and nourished the activism of 
others.”101 
Brandeis had anticipated one of the principles of 
progressive thought when, in 1891, he addressed the 
Massachusetts legislature on a reform issue: “[n]o law can
be effective which does not take into consideration the 
conditions of the community for which it is designed.”102 In 
a speech from 1905 before Harvard undergraduates,
repeated later for law students, Brandeis delivers a
blistering attack on the leaders of the bar holding them
responsible for the decline in the prestige of the 
profession.103 He accuses them of failing to take part in
constructive legislation and expending their efforts “almost
wholly in opposition to the contentions of the people.”104 In 
99. Id. at 464.
100. Brandeis practiced in St. Louis, Missouri, for seven months and then in
Boston from 1879 to 1916; for details of his career as a lawyer, see PHILIPPA
STRUM, LOUIS D. BRANDEIS: JUSTICE FOR THE PEOPLE 26–41, 54–113 (1984);
UROFSKY, supra note 45, at 40–102, 201–227.
101. EDWARD A. PURCELL, JR., BRANDEIS AND THE PROGRESSIVE
CONSTITUTION: ERIE, THE JUDICIAL POWER, AND THE POLITICS OF THE FEDERAL
COURTS IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY AMERICA 118 (2000).
102. UROFSKY, supra note 45, at 209.
103. See Louis D. Brandeis, The Opportunity in the Law, 39 AM. L. REV. 555, 
559–60 (1905).
104. Id. at 560–61.
    
    
    
         
   
     
        
     
          
   
     
       
      
       
     
        
      
      
        
      
 
     
     
             
           
         
             
         
         
             
            
     
            
         
            
    
    
            
    
         
       
7892017] GENEALOGY OF BALANCING
litigation, they have primarily represented the side of 
corporations while “the people have been represented in the 
main by men of very meager legal ability.”105 He foresees an
intensified struggle between “those who have and those who 
have not” and concludes, “people are beginning to doubt
whether in the long run democracy and absolutism can co-
exist in the same community.”106 The speech apparently
had a profound impact on its audiences, which included law
student Felix Frankfurter.107 
The innovation of the “Brandeis brief,”108 first deployed
in Muller v. Oregon,109 would become an important part of 
Brandeis’s litigation strategy.110 In subsequent cases he 
participated in preparing briefs with hundreds of pages of 
factual material.111 He fully intended the Brandeis brief to 
be a direct attack on CLT: “[i]n the past the courts have 
reached their conclusions largely deductively from
preconceived notions and precedents. The method I have 
tried to employ in arguing cases before them has been
inductive, reasoning from the facts.”112 Brandeis brought
105. Id. at 560.
106. Id. at 562.
107. UROFSKY, supra note 45, at 205. Brandeis later commented to his wife, “I
am meeting here & there men who heard my lecture at Brooks house years ago
& say it wholly changed their point of view.” Id.
108. The Brandeis brief combined many of the essential principles of Pound’s
sociological jurisprudence. See, e.g., id. at 217 (discussing how the Brandeis
brief reflected “the need for facts; education of bench, bar, and public; the
relationship of law to the economic, social, and political realities of the day; the
need to mitigate some of the harsher aspects of industrialization; and the use of
law as an instrument of social policy.”).
109. 208 U.S. 412, 419 (1908). Interestingly, Pound never changed his view
that legislatures were better positioned than courts to investigate facts. See
WIGDOR, supra note 56, at 229. Pound’s briefs focused on legal argument and
did not use extra-legal information. Id.
110. Muller, 208 U.S. at 419.
111. UROFSKY, supra note 45, at 225. Brandeis’s briefs in two cases were four-
hundred and six-hundred pages in length and in a third case, 1,021 pages. Id.
112. Ernest Poole, Brandeis, AM. MAG., no. 71, Nov. 1910–Apr. 1911, at 493;
quoted in STRUM, supra note 100, at 124–25.
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the strategy with him to the bench. He thought lawyers
often failed to produce sufficient factual data to support
their arguments and he asked his clerks to perform the 
necessary background research.113 In Jay Burns Baking Co.
v. Bryan,114 for example, the majority struck down a
Nebraska statute regulating the weight of loaves of 
bread.115 In dissent, Brandeis notes:
The determination of these questions involves an enquiry into
facts. Unless we know the facts on which the legislators may have
acted, we cannot properly decide whether they were (or whether 
their measures are) unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious.
Knowledge is essential to understanding; and understanding 
should precede judging. Sometimes, if we would guide by the light
of reason, we must let our minds be bold. But, in this case, we
have merely to acquaint ourselves with the art of bread-making
and the usages of the trade, with the devices by which buyers of
bread are imposed upon and honest bakers or dealers are
subjected by their dishonest fellows to unfair competition; with the
problems which have confronted public officials charged with the
enforcement of the laws prohibiting short weights, and with their
experience in administering those laws.116 
Brandeis then provides those facts in thirty-six 
footnotes detailing the production of bread, surveying
weight regulation at the federal, state, and local level, and
citing arguments in favor of regulation published in Bakers’
Weekly.117 Brandeis admits that some of these facts were 
not known at the time of the lower court judgment, but he 
is not deterred since “experience gained under similar
legislation, and the result of scientific experiments”118 is 
relevant whenever produced.
113. BRANDEIS ON DEMOCRACY 16 (Philippa Strum ed., 1995).
114. 264 U.S. 504 (1924).
115. Id. at 517.
116. Id. at 519–20.
117. Id. at 519–34.
118. Id. at 533.
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Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld is perhaps the most
significant obscure figure in American legal thought. He 
died in 1918 at the young age of thirty-eight, but his ideas
lived on through two law review articles119 and through the 
influence of his Yale Law School colleagues and students.120 
On an initial read, Hohfeld seems to be a formalist but in 
fact his work is a devastating critique of CLT and the 
classical analytical jurisprudence of Jeremy Bentham, John
Stuart Mill, and John Austin. Hohfeld’s system is a unified
field theory of law, sorting legal relations into four (and
only four) types and is now seen as “a landmark in the 
history of legal thought.”121 His system has proven to be 
remarkably durable. Several attempts to expand or contract
the number of relations, and attacks on the legitimacy of 
some of the relations were—and remain—unconvincing.122 
Hohfeld’s central insight is that certain terms critical to 
legal analysis are used in a variety of ways and have no 
119. See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
120. Faculty colleagues Arthur Corbin and Walter Wheeler Cook were
particularly important in persuading others of the importance of Hohfeld’s
work. Curtis Nyquist, Teaching Wesley Hohfeld’s Theory of Legal Relations, 52
J. LEGAL EDUC. 238, 238 (2002). Karl Llewellyn was a student who deployed
Hohfeld’s scheme and vocabulary throughout his career. See N.E.H. Hull, Vital
Schools of Jurisprudence: Roscoe Pound, Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, and the
Promotion of an Academic Jurisprudential Agenda, 1910–1919, 45 J. LEGAL
EDUC. 235, 263 (1995). Two examples of Hohfeld’s influence are Llewellyn’s
narrow issue approach to law (evidenced in his drafting of Article 2 of the
Uniform Commercial Code) and the “bundle of rights” theory of property.
Nyquist, supra, at 238 n. 3, 241. For detailed discussion of Hohfeld’s work see 
also Joseph William Singer, The Legal Rights Debate in Analytical
Jurisprudence from Bentham to Hohfeld, 1982 WIS. L. REV. 975 (1982).
121. Singer, supra note 120, at 978. Classical analytical jurisprudence of the
early nineteenth century was a critical component in the construction of CLT. It
combined laissez faire economic theory, utilitarian philosophy, and
individualistic social theory. See ATIYAH, supra note 44, at 324–25, 353–55, and 
accompanying text.
122. The efforts of Albert Kocourek, for instance, to modify and improve
Hohfeld’s system have been largely ignored. See Singer, supra note 120, at 992.
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generally agreed meaning.123 “This invites confusion,”
Llewellyn comments, “it makes bad logic almost inevitable,
it makes clear statement of clear thought difficult, it makes
clear thought itself improbable.”124 In particular, the word
“right” is used in four different ways. At times it means a
person has an effective claim against another.125 At other
times, it means a person is not subject to an effective claim
by another.126 A third possible meaning is that “right”
means a person has an ability to change a legal relation of 
another.127 At other times, the word “right” means a person
is not subject to having a legal relation changed by the sole 
act of another.128 
Hohfeld creates a vocabulary that distinguishes the 
four uses of the word right; “right,” “privilege,” “power,” and
“immunity.”129 Further, he points out that legal relations
123. See K.N. LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH 95 (1960).
124. LLEWELLYN, supra note 123.
125. In the sentence “A party to a binding contract has a right to the other 
party’s performance,” the word right means that if a party fails to perform the
other party to the contract has an effective claim for breach. See Nyquist, supra
note 120, at 239–40.
126. In the sentence “Since flag burning is protected speech, a person has a
right to burn a flag,” the word right means the state does not have an effective
claim. See id.
127. In the sentence “The state of Massachusetts has a right to call me to jury
duty (since Massachusetts is my domicile),” the word right means that my
privilege of not reporting for jury duty could be changed to a duty to report if
Massachusetts sends me a summons. See id. at 239–41
128. In the sentence “I have a right not to be called to jury duty in Rhode
Island (since Rhode Island is not my domicile),” the word right means my
privilege of not reporting for jury duty could not be changed even if Rhode
Island sends me a summons. See id. at 239–40.
129. In Hohfeld’s scheme the sentences in footnotes 125 through 128 would
read:
“A party to a binding contract has a right to the other party’s
performance.”
“Since flag burning is protected speech, a person has a privilege to burn
a flag.”
“The state of Massachusetts has a power to call me to jury duty (since 
Massachusetts is my domicile).”
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are always between two persons and he provides
terminology for the other end of the relation; “duty,” “no-
right,” “liability,” and “disability.” In other words, a legal
relation is like two people holding the opposite ends of a
stick.130 Hohfeld uses the term correlative to describe the 
opposite ends of legal relations; right is always linked with
duty, and so on.131 In his 1913 article he provides a table of 
correlatives, depicted in Table 1.
“I have an immunity from being called to jury duty in Rhode Island
(since Rhode Island is not my domicile).”
See id. at 240. Joseph Singer defines the legal relations as follows:
“Rights” are claims, enforceable by state power, t[h]at others act in a
certain manner in relation to the rightholder. “Privileges” are
permissions to act in a certain manner without being liable for
damages to others and wit[h]out others being able to summon state
power to prevent those acts. “Powers” are state-enforced abilities to 
c[h]ange legal entitlements held by oneself or ot[h]ers, and
“immunities” are security from having one’s own entitlements changed
by others.
Singer, supra note 120, at 986. The only term in Hohfeld’s vocabulary that is
potentially misleading is “liability” which in general has a negative cast. That is
not Hohfeld’s intention and he is careful to point out that a “liability” can be a 
good thing; in his system liability only means that another can change one of
your legal relations:
Thus X, the owner of a watch, has the power to abandon his
property . . . and correlatively to X’s power of abandonment there is a 
liability [to become the new owner] in every other person. But such a
liability instead of being onerous or unwelcome, is quite the opposite.
Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions, supra note 53, at 54 n.90.
130. See Nyquist, supra note 120, at 240. In The Bramble Bush Llewellyn
summarizes the idea of legal relations:
There is a person on each end, always. A has a right that B shall do 
something. I repeat, when, should B fail to do it, A can get the court to
make trouble for B. But the right has B on the other end. The right is
indeed the duty, a duty seen other end to. The relation is identical; the 
only difference is in the point of observation.
LLEWLLYN, supra note 123, at 96.
131. See Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions, supra note 53, at 30.
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TABLE 1. Jural Correlatives132 
Right Privilege Power Immunity
Duty No-Right Liability Disability
Hohfeld’s system undermines CLT and classical
analytical jurisprudence in several ways. The classics
focused their work on privileges (they used the term
liberties) and rights.133 Hohfeld points out that they were 
blending two different legal relations.134 Moreover, they
assumed a privilege imposed a duty of non-interference on
others.135 In the classics’ scheme, once the state had decided
an act was privileged, it meant both that others have no 
effective claim against the person exercising the privilege 
and also that others have a duty of non-interference.136 
Hohfeld establishes that the issues are separate; sometimes
the state imposes a duty of non-interference and sometimes
not.137 There are many instances in law where privileges
conflict.138 In other words, A may be privileged to perform
an act while B is privileged to interfere with the act.139 The 
classics’ assumption that duties can be logically derived
from privileges was shown to be erroneous.140 The question
of imposing a duty raises a policy issue and cannot be 
decided “without fresh exercises of ethical judgment.”141 
132. Id.
133. Nyquist, supra note 120, at 253–54.
134. Id. at 252 n.45.
135. Id. at 253–54.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 251–52.
138. Id. at 253–54.
139. Id. at 254.
140. Id. at 251–52.
141. See Frank I. Michelman, Commentary, in Fred R. Shapiro, The Most
Cited Articles from The Yale Law Journal, 100 YALE L.J. 1449, 1511–12 (1991).
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The case Ploof v. Putnam142 illustrates a court falling
into the error of deducing duties from privileges.143 While 
the plaintiff was sailing, a storm arose and he tied his boat
to the defendant’s dock.144 The defendant untied the boat
causing personal injuries and damage to the boat.145 The 
court held the defendant liable because of the doctrine of 
necessity.146 It cited Proctor v. Adams,147 among other
necessity cases, in support of its decision, “the defendant
went upon the plaintiff’s beach for the purpose of saving
and restoring to the lawful owner a boat which had been
driven ashore, and was in danger of being carried off by the 
sea; and it was held no trespass.”148 But that is not the 
issue in Ploof. The issue in Ploof is whether, when a boat is
moored to a dock because of the doctrine of necessity, a
court should impose a duty on the dock owner to allow it to 
remain or grant a privilege to untie. In such a case, the 
court faces a policy choice. There would be no logical
inconsistency in saying the plaintiff is privileged to tie his
boat to the dock and the defendant is privileged to untie.149 
Furthermore, the classics’ system purported to create a
clear test by which privileges and duties could be 
determined. Joseph Singer observes:
The classical analytical jurists . . . invented a meta-theory based
on the distinction between self-regarding and other-regarding
acts . . . . People were free to do anything that did not hurt others.
To the extent a person’s acts were conceived to be harmful to
others, they were prohibited . . . . The actions that were permitted
142. 71 A. 188 (Vt. 1908).
143. Nyquist, supra note 120, at 248–49.
144. Ploof, 71 A. at 188.
145. Id. at 188–89.
146. Id. at 189.
147. 113 Mass. 376 (1873).
148. Ploof, 71 A. at 189.
149. See Nyquist, supra note 120, at 248–49, for further discussion of the
consequences of Hohfeld’s system for case analysis.
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were also thought to be protected against interference by others.150 
Under this system, injury without compensation
(damnum absque injuria) was virtually invisible. Hohfeld’s
critique focuses attention on damnum absque injuria and 
we now realize that instances of injury without
compensation are not just tolerated by our legal system, but
reflect fundamental policies.151 Just as duties cannot be 
derived from privileges, duties cannot be derived from
injury since many injuries do not lead to compensation.
Classical analytical jurisprudence defined law as the 
command of the sovereign, but Hohfeld points out that their
theory of law focused only on right/duty. In Corbin’s words
“society not only commands but also permits and enables
and disables.”152 CLT also assumed that laissez faire did not
implicate the state. One of the consequences of Hohfeld’s
critique is that we now see that laissez faire was a 
regulatory system; once the state has come into existence,
regulation is inevitable. Using contract as an illustration, in
a sale of goods by a merchant under laissez faire there was
no implied warranty of merchantability. That system has
been replaced by Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code 
which creates an implied warranty.153 But we have not
moved from an unregulated market to regulated; we have 
merely changed how we regulate.154 
150. Singer, supra note 120, at 984.
151. For instance, in contract the requirement that damages be established
within a reasonable degree of certainty means that many injuries caused by
breach of contract are damnum absque injuria. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTS § 352 (AM. LAW INST. 1981). The rule reflects policies of preventing
judges and juries from speculating on damages, encouraging efficient breach, 
and an overarching goal that contract damages should compensate the victim,
not punish the party in breach. See Nyquist, supra note 120, at 254, for further 
discussion of damnum absque injuria in contract law.
152. Arthur L. Corbin, Jural Relations and Their Classification, 30 YALE L.J.
226, 237 (1921).
153. U.C.C. § 2-314 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1999).
154. For further discussion of laissez faire as a regulatory system, see J.M.
Balkin, The Hohfeldian Approach to Law and Semiotics, 44 U. MIAMI L. REV. 
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Hohfeld’s 1913 article expresses the hope that once his
system has clarified legal analysis, the greater “become[s] 
one’s perception of fundamental unity and harmony in the 
law.”155 American legal thought has not followed the path
he anticipated. Hohfeld’s system continues to serve as an
important source of critique156 but his reconstructive side is
largely ignored.
Benjamin Cardozo counts as an important figure in the 
Progressive Era not due to his contributions as an academic
(he never joined a faculty) but because of his twenty-five 
years on the bench157 and his lecture series The Nature of 
the Judicial Process reflecting on the role of the judge.158 
Cardozo held a philosophy of law in stark contrast to CLT;
his jurisprudence reflects a movement from rules toward
standards, from individualism toward altruism, and from a
mechanical view of judging toward a dynamic view.159 In 
1921 Cardozo noted, “[w]e are getting away from . . . the 
conception of a lawsuit either as a mathematical problem or
as a sportsman’s game”160 and “[w]e are thinking of the end
which the law serves, and fitting its rules to the task of 
1119, 1124–25 (1990); Duncan Kennedy & Frank Michelman, Are Property and
Contract Efficient?, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 711, 754–57 (1980).
155. Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions, supra note 53, at 59.
156. Hohfeld is often cited in the literature of critical legal studies. See, e.g., 
KENNEDY, supra note 10, at 82–92, 276; ROBERTO MANGABEIRA UNGER, THE
CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES MOVEMENT 6–7 (1986); Balkin, supra note 154, at
1131, 1133, 1141; Singer, supra note 120, at 1058–59. For a recent article
continuing the critical perspective see Pierre Schlag, How to do Things With
Hohfeld, 78 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 185 (2015).
157. Cardozo was elected as a New York trial court judge in 1913 but after 
only five weeks filled a vacancy on the New York Court of Appeals where he sat
until 1932. KAUFMAN, supra note 55, at 126. He was then appointed to the U.S.
Supreme Court and served until 1938. Id. at 471, 566–67.
158. CARDOZO, supra note 15.
159. See id. at 101–02.
160. Id. at 101–02.
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service.”161 
Under CLT judges were seen as sorting through the 
facts of a case and mechanically applying a rule which
dictated the result.162 The preferred form of law was rules
rather than standards.163 Rules are bright-line statements
of law that appear to give a judge or jury little, if any,
discretion. The archetypal example is the minimum age for
voting: a person is eligible to vote when they reach their
eighteenth birthday and not a moment before. Standards, 
on the other hand, are open-ended statements of law that
appeal to a general policy and permit wide discretion.
Instances in contract include unconsionability164 and good
faith.165 Individualism holds that it is acceptable for each
person to look out only for his or her own interests, there is
no obligation to share gains or contribute to losses, and
legal duties should be reduced to a minimum.166 The 
opposed vision, altruism, argues it is not acceptable to 
consider your own interests only, the community is more 
important than the individual, and if the individual is
unwilling to share gains or losses, the legal system should
impose duties to do so.167 
Cardozo’s judicial philosophy was fully evident in Wood
161. Id. at 102.
162. See, e.g., Boone v. Coe, 154 S.W. 900 (Ky. 1913) (rejecting a tenant
farmer’s claim for reliance damages because of his failure to comply with the
Statute of Frauds).
163. See Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 
89 HARV. L. REV. 1685, 1685 (1976) (discussing the distinction between rules
and standards).
164. U.C.C. § 2-302 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2014); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208.
165. U.C.C. § 1-304 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2014); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205.
166. For further discussion of individualism and altruism, see Mary Joe Frug,
Re-Reading Contracts: A Feminist Analysis of a Contracts Casebook, 34 AM. 
U.L. REV. 1065, 1121–25 (1985); Kennedy, supra note 163, at 1713–22.
167. See supra note 166.
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v. Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon.168 In Wood, the defendant had
agreed to give the plaintiff exclusive rights to place her
name on dress designs with the parties splitting “all profits
and revenues.”169 The defendant entered into an agreement
in violation of the contract and the plaintiff sued to recover
his share of the proceeds.170 The defendant argued that
since the contract did not specify any duties on the part of 
the plaintiff, it was unenforceable for lack of consideration.
Cardozo held the contract enforceable since it was “instinct 
with an obligation”171 and a “promise is fairly to be 
implied.”172 Wood is one of the cases that established the 
contemporary contract principle of good faith and
“displace[s] . . . one image of contract by another. The 
consequence of that displacement is a greater involvement
by courts in policing the performance of contracts.”173 
Cardozo’s lecture series “The Nature of the Judicial
Process,” delivered at Yale Law School over four days in
1921, was a stunning success.174 A judge publically
reflecting on his role was unprecedented in American law
and Cardozo’s persona insured the occasion would be 
unforgettable. Forty years later Arthur Corbin reflected on
the event:
[E]ach day at 6 p.m. the ritual of the first day was exactly 
repeated—the rising of the audience, the continuous applause, the
smile of pleasure, the appreciative bow, and the leaving with the
168. 118 N.E. 214 (N.Y. 1917).
169. Id. at 214.
170. Id. at 214. Research by Walter Pratt has established that Duff-Gordon’s
agreement was with Sears, Roebuck and Company. Walter F. Pratt, Jr.,
American Contract Law at the Turn of the Century, 39 S.C. L. REV. 415, 439–40 
(1988).
171. Wood, 118 N.E. at 214.
172. Id.
173. Pratt, supra note 170, at 415. For further discussion of Wood, see id. at
420, 429–32, 438–43, 457–64.
174. Arthur L. Corbin, The Judicial Process Revisited: Introduction, 71 YALE 
L.J. 195, 195 (1961).
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faculty while all others stood and cheered. Both what he had said
and his manner of saying it had held us spell-bound on four
successive days . . . . Never again have I had a like experience.175 
As Cardozo’s lectures were relatively late in the 
Progressive Era, it is not surprising he primarily focused on
reconstruction rather than critique. He emphasized core 
Progressive Era values: the importance of policy,176 the 
movement from individualism to interdependence,177 
inductive reasoning rather than deductive reasoning,178 the 
sociological method,179 and although “logic and history and
custom have their place . . . [t]he end which the law serves
will dominate them all.”180 
Cardozo’s view of American society has been aptly
summarized by his biographer Andrew Kaufman:
Cardozo shared the optimism that characterized the political
philosophy of progressives like Theodore Roosevelt, and his
attitude was related to what became known later as the consensus
view of American history: What unites Americans as a people is
more important than what divides them; society’s dominant
interest groups accepted a broad common framework of social and 
175. Id. at 198.
176. See, e.g., CARDOZO, supra note 15, at 73 (“It is true, I think, today in
every department of the law that the social value of a rule has become a test of
growing power and importance.”).
177. See e.g., KAUFMAN, supra note 55, at 214 (quoting BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO,
THE PARADOXES OF LEGAL SCIENCE 19 (1928) (“growing altruism, or if not this, a 
growing sense of social interdependence.”)).
178. CARDOZO, supra note 15, at 22–23 (“The common law does not work from
pre-established truths of universal and inflexible validity to conclusions derived
from them deductively. Its method is inductive, and it draws its generalizations
from particulars.”).
179. See, e.g., id. at 94 (“I pass to another field where the dominance of the
method of sociology may be reckoned as assured. There are some rules of
private law which have been shaped in their creation by public policy, and this,
not merely silently or in conjunction with other forces, but avowedly, and 
almost, if not quite, exclusively. These, public policy, as determined by new
conditions, is competent to change.”).
180. Id. at 66. quoted in KAUFMAN, supra note 55, at 208.
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economic values.181 
Furthermore, Cardozo saw the judge as playing a
central role in adapting law to address the needs of 
society.182 In an article published in December 1921 he 
called for the establishment of a governmental agency that
would communicate to courts the need of society as
identified by legislatures.183 He creates an image of 
legislators as workers in a mine, discovering society’s ills,
but unable to communicate with courts who could act as
rescuers: “We must have a courier who will carry the 
tidings of distress to those who are there to save when
signals reach their ears.”184 
II. THE REALIST ERA 
By 1923, progressive legal thought provided a powerful
alternative to CLT. It had demonstrated that general
principles were not operative to determine particular rules
or dictate results in particular cases. It viewed CLT as
appropriate to the nineteenth century but its rigidity and
formality had proven inadequate to respond to changes in
society. Law had failed to rethink its individualistic
foundations as American culture had moved from
independence to interdependence. On the reconstruction
side, progressive legal thought proposed that law should
respond to society’s ills. Legislatures should study the 
issues facing society and through legislation (with the 
support and assistance of courts) address those issues. “The 
key to . . . sociological jurisprudence,” notes Duncan
Kennedy, “was the idea that the ‘is’ of sociology would
engender a legal ‘ought,’ with the social scientist in the role 
181. KAUFMAN, supra note 55, at 216–17.
182. See Benjamin N. Cardozo, A Ministry of Justice, 35 HARV. L. REV. 113,
113–14 (1921).
183. Id.
184. Id. at 113.
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of midwife.”185 
The conservative response to the critique of CLT 
continued throughout the 1923 to 1941 era, so there was
still much work to be done. For example, the restatement
project, in the opinion of Grant Gilmore, “may be taken as 
the reaction of a conservative establishment, eager to 
preserve a threatened status quo.”186 Realist Era critics of 
the Restatements include Thurman Arnold,187 Hessel
Yntema,188 Walter Wheeler Cook,189and Felix Cohen.190 
Standard histories of this era focus on the critique of CLT,
and there is no question this was an important theme. For
instance, a review of Herbert Goodrich’s 1927 Handbook on
the Conflict of Laws,191 by Hessel Yentema,192 applies the 
185. Duncan Kennedy, From the Will Theory to the Principle of Private
Autonomy: Lon Fuller’s “Consideration and Form”, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 94, 120 
(2000).
186. GRANT GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAW 73 (1977).
187. Thurman Arnold, The Restatement of the Law of Trusts, 31 COLUM. L.
REV. 800, 800 (1931) (“But if such abstractions [principles, rules, and standards]
are applied to an assorted group of dissimilar situations, involving different
problems, they begin to cut across the cases in zigzag lines which are impossible
either to follow or predict, without endless refinement, reclassification, and
qualifying abstractions.”); Id. at 823 (“[Professor Scott’s] unquestioned skill
shown in the attempt to restate trusts as a philosophy is the best proof that it
cannot be done.”).
188. Hessel E. Yntema, The Restatement of the Law of Conflict of Laws, 36 
COLUM. L. REV. 183, 185 (1936) (“In other words, aside from more obvious
difficulties of restating this subject, there is some reason to apprehend that both 
the theoretical and the practical bases of this Restatement are shifting under
foot.”).
189. See generally Walter Wheeler Cook, Williston on Contracts, 33 ILL. L.
REV. 497 (1938–39) (reviewing the second edition of Williston’s contract treatise
which Cook views as explanatory of the contract restatement, applying a 
Hohfeldian analysis, and arguing that Williston fails to distinguish factual
components of agreements and the resulting legal relations).
190. Cohen, supra note 2, at 833 (“The age of the classical jurists is over, I
think. The ‘Restatement of the Law’ by the American Law Institute is the last
long-drawn-out gasp of a dying tradition.”).
191. HERBERT F. GOODRICH, HANDBOOK ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS (1927).
192. Hessel E. Yntema, The Hornbook Method and the Conflict of Laws, 37 
YALE L.J. 468 (1928).
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fundamental principles of the Progressive Era critique;
Goodrich’s work is too abstract,193 overemphasizes logic at
the expense of experience,194 and is obsessed with rules.195 
Lon Fuller’s work from the 1930’s shows how the 
Progressive Era’s critique of CLT was imbedded in and
taken for granted by Realist Era scholarship. In 1934, he 
published an attack on legal realism,196 and yet his 1939
review of a revision of Williston’s contract treatise shares
many of the assumptions of the Realist Era.197 Williston’s
treatise draws a clear line between contract and other
subjects which can be maintained only “if one does not
press too far an inquiry into the underlying bases of legal
liability.”198 If one asks the reasons “contract or tort liability
is imposed, one discovers that the underlying ‘why’, or
rather, the underlying ‘whys’, cut across compartmental
divisions of the law.”199 In commenting on cases, the 
treatise has “too strict a sense of what is normal . . . [and] 
ha[s] rejected as freaks far too many cases which are really
significant.”200 And the fundamental principles of contract
“are nowhere in his work critically examined in the light of 
the social interests they serve.”201 In other words, in the 
Realist Era both self-described realists and their critics
shared many assumptions about law that had been
193. Id. at 477.
194. Id. Yntema borrows Holmes’ aphorism “The life of the law has not been
logic, it has been experience” to punctuate his point. Id. (“If the realm of law
were like mathematics . . . no one could object to peopling the legal world with
principles, rights or other juristic constructions. But law is not logic, however
usefully logic may be made to serve the ends of law.”).
195. Id. at 479.
196. L. L. Fuller, American Legal Realism, 82 U. PA L. REV. 429 (1934).
197. See generally Lon L. Fuller, Williston on Contracts: Revised Edition, 18 
N.C. L. REV. 1 (1939).
198. Id. at 2.
199. Id.
200. Id. at 3.
201. Id. at 9.
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established in the Progressive Era. But Realist Era
scholarship was engaged in a more significant project:
critiquing the Progressive Era.
A. The Realist Era and Cognitive Relativism 
Realist Era thought was centered at Columbia Law
School, Johns Hopkins University Institute for the Study of 
Law (1928–33), and Yale Law School. Principal participants
included Thurman Arnold (Yale),202 Felix Cohen
(Department of the Interior),203 Walter Wheeler Cook (Yale,
Johns Hopkins, and Northwestern University School of 
Law),204 Jerome Frank (private practice and Securities and
Exchange Commission),205 Leon Green (Yale and
Northwestern),206 Karl Llewellyn (Columbia),207 Underhill
Moore (Columbia and Yale),208 Herman Oliphant
(Columbia, Johns Hopkins, and United States Treasury
Department),209 and Hessel Yntema (Columbia, Johns
Hopkins, and University of Michigan Law School).210 
The critique of the Progressive Era is intertwined with
and based on a cognitive relativism derived from science.
202. HORWITZ, supra note 6, at 311 n.56.
203. DALIA TSUK MITCHELL, ARCHITECT OF JUSTICE, FELIX S. COHEN AND THE
FOUNDING OF AMERICAN LEGAL PLURALISM 4 (2007).
204. HORWITZ, supra note 6, at 313–14 n.85; Guide to the Walter Wheeler Cook
(1873–1943) Papers, NORTHWESTERN UNIV. ARCHIVES, http://www.finding aids
library/Northwestern.edu (last visited May 14, 2016).
205. ROBERT JEROME GLENNON, THE ICONOCLAST AS REFORMER: JEROME 
FRANK’S IMPACT ON AMERICAN LAW 9, 18–21, 27–30 (1985).
206. HORWITZ, supra note 6, at 317 n.104.
207. WILLIAM TWINING, KARL LLEWELLYN AND THE REALIST MOVEMENT 102–03 
(1973).
208. Id. at 42, 53.
209. HORWITZ, supra note 6, at 313 n.85.
210. TWINING, supra note 207 at 46, 60; See also Hessel E. Yntema, UNIV.
MICH. LAW SCH. FACULTY , 
http:www.law.umich.edu/historyandtraditions/faculty/Faculty_Lists/Alpha_Fac
ulty/Pages/HesselEYntema.aspx (last visited April 7, 2016).
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An article from 1933 would begin, “[t]he spirit of the times
is scientific.”211 Although the Progressive Era also 
highlighted science “[w]hen pre-war Progressives spoke of a
‘scientific’ approach to social problems,” explains G. Edward
White, “they normally analogized to one of the social
sciences [statistics, ethnology, economics, and sociology].”212 
Realist Era thinkers, on the other hand, were drawn to 
psychology, physics, mathematics, chemistry, and
geometry.
Thinking About Thinking,213 a book published in 1926
by Columbia mathematics professor Cassius Keyser, proved
to have enormous influence. Jerome Frank refers to 
Thinking About Thinking as “an invaluable aid to his non-
mathematically trained mind in understanding the nature 
of non-Euclidean thinking.”214 Keyser surveys the history of 
“autonomous thinking,”215 which he also calls “postulational
thinking,” particularly with reference to Euclidean and non-
Euclidean geometry.216 He says of Euclidean geometry,
“when it was produced it was so incomparably superior to 
any other product of human thinking that men were 
dazzled by it, blinded by its very brilliance.”217 It held the 
field for two thousand years until the work of Bolyai and
Lobachevski established non-Euclidean geometries, equally
211. Hessel E. Yntema, The Implications of Legal Science, 10 N.Y.U. L.Q.
REV. 279, 279 (1933).
212. G. Edward White, From Sociological Jurisprudence to Realism:
Jurisprudence and Social Change in Early Twentieth-Century America, 58 VA.
L. REV. 999, 1014 (1972).
213. CASSIUS J. KEYSER, THINKING ABOUT THINKING (1926).
214. Jerome Frank, Mr. Justice Holmes and Non-Euclidean Thinking, 17
CORNELL L.Q. 568, 572 n.10 (1932).
215. KEYSER, supra note 213, at 22–23. Keyser describes “autonomous
thinking” as taking the “if-then” form. Id. (“What is asserted and what is true is
that, if the postulates are true, then their implicates are true. It is important to
grasp the fact that this if-then assertion is true both when the postulates are
true and when they are false.”).
216. Id. at 31.
217. Id. at 26.
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valid, but based on different postulates and “[t]here ensued
a revolution in the theory of knowledge, the philosophy of 
science was greatly advanced, and postulational thinking 
was henceforth to play increasingly a double role, that of 
builder and that of critic or judge.”218 Keyser points out it is
a “grave mistake” to believe postulational thinking is
limited to mathematics: “[t]he method is available in every
field of thought, in the physical sciences, in the moral or
social sciences, in all matters and situations where it is
important . . . to have logically organized bodies of 
doctrine.”219 Keyser would publish in law reviews220 
stressing the importance of applying postulational thinking
to law and the necessity that “hidden determinants . . . be 
dragged forth from their hiding places into the light.”221 
Walter Wheeler Cook was an assistant professor in
mathematics at Columbia and from 1895 to 1897 held the 
John Tyndall Traveling Fellowship in Physics which
allowed him to spend those years in Germany.222 Math and 
physics would provide a foundation for his critique of the 
Progressive Era. Cook’s Scientific Method and the Law,223 
published in the American Bar Association Journal,
summarizes recent developments in physics, chemistry,
218. Id. at 31–32.
219. Id. at 35.
220. See, e.g., Cassius J. Keyser, On the Study of Legal Science, 38 YALE L.J.
413 (1929); see also Cassius J. Keyser, The Nature of the Doctrinal Function and
its Role in Rational Thought, 41 YALE L.J. 713 (1932) [hereinafter Keyser,
Nature].
221. Keyser, Nature, supra note 220, at 744.
222. NORTHWESTERN UNIV. ARCHIVES, supra note 204. See also JOHN HENRY 
SCHLEGEL, AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM AND EMPIRICAL SOCIAL SCIENCE 28 (1995).
(“Inexplicably, while in Germany he studied not just the sciences but also
philosophy and law . . . and psychology . . . . This deviation did not seem to
bother the Department of Mathematics, which, on his return in late fall 1897,
hired him as an assistant for two more years.”).
223. Walter W. Cook, Scientific Method and the Law, 13 A.B.A. J. 303 (1927)
(The article was based on Cook’s 1927 commencement day address at Johns
Hopkins.).
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geometry, and mathematics.224 In physics, for example, he 
discusses nineteenth century physics when it was believed
“finality had been reached.”225 Cook then summarizes the 
transformation of physics over the past thirty years: “the 
abandonment of the doctrines of the conservation of mass,
of matter, and of energy as principles of universal
applicability, the refusal of electrons to obey the accepted
laws of mechanics; the quantum theory—all these and
others have left modern physical science gasping for
breath.”226 In expanding the analysis beyond physics he 
quotes Cassius Keyser: “the old cosmic absolutes—absolute 
space, absolute time, absolute matter, absolute natural law,
absolute truth—are gone. The reign of relativity . . . is 
destined to work a corresponding revolution, deep, noiseless
it may be, but inevitable, in all the views and institutions of 
man.”227 In the physical sciences, Cook concludes, “[w]e 
have reached the era of relativity” and he characterizes
relativity as “a point of view which . . . seems destined to 
remain as a permanent achievement in human thought.”228 
In law, Cook points out, where the profession is
confronted with situations even more complex than the 
physical sciences, we find it “the more insistent . . . as to the 
prior existence of fixed and universal principles or laws 
which can be discovered and directly applied and
followed.”229 Cook castigates Pound and legal education
generally for teaching the “‘traditional and known
technique of the common law,’ [which] is as grotesquely
inadequate for legal purposes as the childish mechanical
notions of the nineteenth century have shown themselves to 
224. Id. at 305–06.
225. Id. at 304.
226. Id. at 305.
227. Id. at 306.
228. Id.
229. Id. at 307.
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be in the field of physics.”230 Cook’s plea for a different type 
of law school, “a community of scholars, devoted to the 
scientific study of law as a social institution and to the 
training of other scholars for the same pursuit,”231 would
result in the establishment of the Institute for the Study of 
Law at Johns Hopkins.232 The Institute closed in 1933 for
lack of funding, but the point is not whether Cook’s call for
reform of legal education was a success or failure.233 His
1927 article was a call to take the lessons of science 
seriously and thinkers in the Realist Era responded.
The 1920s and 30s would be a particularly rich period
in science with developments in quantum theory (e.g.
Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle), discussion of the 
observer effect (i.e. how observing reality affects reality),
and so on. In March of 1927, Werner Heisenberg published
an article that was “simple, subtle, and startling.”234 It 
challenged the scientific assumption that the natural world
could be studied and understood.235 David Lindley
summarizes the uncertainty principle:
You can measure the speed of a particle, or you can measure its
position, but you can’t measure both. Or: the more precisely you
find out the position, the less well you can know its speed. Or,
more indirectly and less obviously, the act of observing changes
the thing observed . . . . In the classical picture of the natural 
world as a great machine, it had been taken for granted that all
the working parts of the machinery could be defined with limitless
precision and that all their interconnections could be exactly
230. Id. at 308.
231. Id.
232. See SCHLEGEL, supra note 222, at 147, 153. Cook had joined the Johns
Hopkins faculty in 1926 primarily to develop a proposal for a school of
jurisprudence. Id. at 147–48. His Scientific Method and the Law address was
part of that effort, and the Institute was founded in 1928 with four faculty
(Cook, Herman Oliphant, Hessel Yntema, and Leon Marshall) and closed in
1933. See id. at 147–210.
233. Id. at 209–10.
234. DAVID LINDLEY, UNCERTAINTY: EINSTEIN, HEISENBERG, BOHR, AND THE
STRUGGLE FOR THE SOUL OF SCIENCE 1 (2007).
235. Id. at 1.
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understood . . . . Heisenberg, it seemed, was saying that you
couldn’t always find out what you wanted to know, that your 
ability even to describe the natural world was circumscribed. If
you couldn’t describe it as you wished, how could you hope to
reason out its laws?236 
Jerome Frank developed a deep interest in psychology
that would provide a lifelong trajectory for his work.237 He 
had been so impressed with his daughter’s treatment with
psychiatrist Bernard Glueck he decided to undergo analysis
himself and convinced Glueck to compress a year’s
treatment into six months.238 Frank and Glueck met twice a
day and during this treatment Frank began Law and the
Modern Mind.239 And apparently most, if not all, of the 
Realist Era thinkers read scientific literature. Even the 
titles of several articles betray their interest; Mr. Justice
Holmes and Non-Euclidean Thinking,240 The Rational Basis
of Legal Science,241 The Implications of Legal Science,242 
Can Law Be Scientific?243 and two articles entitled
Scientific Method and the Law.244 
236. Id. at 4. Recent research has established that the uncertainty principle
does not depend on the observer effect, although Heisenberg connected the two;
the uncertainty principle still holds even when the observer effect is eliminated.
See Aya Furuta, One Thing Is Certain: Heisenberg’s Uncertainty Principle Is
Not Dead, SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN (Mar. 8, 2012) http:// www.scientific 
american.com/article/heisenbergs-uncertainty-principle-is-not-dead/. But the
development is irrelevant to the point of this Article which focuses on the
impact on law of the 1920’s and 30’s versions of science and other disciplines.
237. See HOROWITZ, supra note 6, at 176.
238. HORWITZ, supra note 6, at 176 (quoting ROBERT J. GLENNON, THE
ICONOCLAST AS REFORMER 21(1985)).
239. JEROME FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND (1930); HORWITZ, supra note
6, at 176.
240. Frank, supra note 214.
241. Hessel E. Yntema, The Rational Basis of Legal Science, 31 COLUM. L.
REV. 925 (1931).
242. Yntema, supra note 211.
243. Edwin W. Patterson, Can Law Be Scientific?, 25 ILL. L. REV. 121 (1930).
244. Cook, supra note 223; Max Radin, Scientific Method and the Law, 19 
CAL. L. REV. 164 (1931).
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Beyond science, the period between the world wars was 
an era of upheaval in the visual arts, literature, political
theory, ethics, and many other disciplines.245 In The Ages of 
American Law, Grant Gilmore refers to this period, when
the very foundations of thought were open to question, as
“the age of anxiety.”246 He characterizes the jurisprudence 
of Wesley Sturges, who was dean at Yale Law School and
“revered as the greatest of teachers,”247 as “[bearing] a
striking resemblance to the more despairing novels of Franz 
Kafka.”248 Sturges produced little scholarship and focused
on topics like the case law of mortgages in North Carolina
“a subject of no conceivable interest to Sturges or anyone 
else.”249 Gilmore characterizes the goal of the study as an
attempt “to demonstrate that the North Carolina law of 
mortgages made no sense and could most charitably be 
described as a species of collective insanity on the 
march.”250 
In a review of Frank’s Law and the Modern Mind,
Bruce Ackerman comments on the Realist Era:
Without straining too hard, one can discern parallels to the
thought of Frank and his fellow Realists in twentieth-century art
and science. Stravinsky, Picasso, Joyce, Einstein, and Freud each
radically challenged the effort to structure objective reality into a
single determinate rationalizable order. Moving beyond this, each
inaugurated a search for a new kind of order consistent with their
attack upon the simpler conception of rationality held by their
predecessors—a search which has led many fields of inquiry to
turn inward upon themselves until the very idea of a common 
245. See, e.g., EDWARD A. PURCELL, JR., THE CRISIS OF DEMOCRATIC THEORY:
SCIENTIFIC NATURALISM & THE PROBLEM OF VALUE 115–78 (1973) (describing the
1930s threat to democratic theory from totalitarian forms of government.).
246. GILMORE, supra note 186, at 68–69.
247. Id. at 80–81.
248. Id. at 81.
249. Id.
250. Id.
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cultural tradition has become problematic.251 
B. Realist Era Critique of the Progressive Era 
Although the Realist Era continued the critique of CLT,
fundamentally it was the Progressive Era being attacked.
Of this, Pound had no doubt. In The Formative Era of 
American Law,252 published in 1938, he wrote:
Today rationalism is under attack from another quarter. A 
psychological realism is abroad which regards reason as affording
no more than a cover of illusion for processes judicial and 
administrative which are fundamentally and necessarily
unrational. But merely destructive so-called realism makes
neither for stability nor for change since it gives us nothing in
place of what it would take away.253 
The critique was sometimes linked with an
acknowledgement of a debt to the Progressive Era: “Pound’s
work . . . is full to bursting of magnificent insight”;254 
“Cardozo, it would seem, has reached adult emotional
stature”;255 “[Pound’s] vast erudition has enabled him to 
find hidden significance in various aspects and items of 
legal development”;256 and “Pound has done good pioneering
here.”257 The compliment is invariably followed by a
devastating critique. Although Pound provides magnificent
251. Bruce A. Ackerman, Law and the Modern Mind by Jerome Frank, 103
DAEDALUS 119, 125–26 (1974).
252. ROSCOE POUND, THE FORMATIVE ERA OF AMERICAN LAW (1938).
253. Id. at 27–28.
254. Karl N. Llewellyn, A Realistic Jurisprudence—The Next Step, 30 COLUM.
L. REV. 431, 435 n.3 (1930).
255. FRANK, supra note 239, at 253. This could have been high praise indeed 
from Frank whose psychological analysis of law viewed “paralyzing father-
worship [as] one of the hidden causes of men’s belief in a body of infallible law.”
Id. at 261. Notice, however, the “it would seem” qualifier. Id. (emphasis added).
256. William L. Grossman, The Legal Philosophy of Roscoe Pound, 44 YALE 
L.J. 605, 605 (1935).
257. K. N. Llewellyn, On Reading and Using the Newer Jurisprudence, 40
COLUM. L. REV. 581, 594 (1940).
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insight, “these brilliant buddings have in the main not come 
to fruition . . . [and his work is] at times on the level of bed-
time stories for the tired bar.”258 Although Cardozo seems
mature, “he is not ready to abandon entirely the ancient
dream” and “the absence of mathematical legal exactness is
what Cardozo laments.”259 Although Pound displays vast
erudition, since he provides no standard for choosing among
desiderata outside the scale of the desiderata itself, “[n]ever
was there a more obvious attempt to lift oneself by one’s
own bootstraps.”260 And Pound’s pioneering scholarship, his 
discussion of ideal elements in law and “the stabilizing force 
of ‘taught traditions’” are interesting ideas “but what these 
mean in detail, when one gets down to cases, lies still
unexplored.”261 
The critique was based on five ideas: sociological
jurisprudence betrayed an unmerited confidence in rules; it
viewed fact-finding by courts as unproblematic; it failed to 
notice the observer effect; it was unwilling to examine its
postulates; and in attempting to derive law from studying
society, it fell into the same conceptualist error as Classical
Legal Thought.262 
Rule skepticism has been recognized as a hallmark of 
the Realist Era for many years, but the point here is that
the critique included both CLT and the Progressive Era.
The Progressive Era displayed an underlying confidence in
the ability to categorize, manipulate, and deploy law. Pound
divides statements of law into two types: “rules” to govern
“conveyance of land, inheritance and succession, and
258. Llewellyn, supra note 254, at 435 n.3.
259. FRANK, supra note 239, at 254.
260. Grossman, supra note 256, at 610.
261. Llewellyn, supra note 257, at 594.
262. See Kennedy, supra note 9, at 671–73 (“The critique of is-to-ought
included a move similar to the abuse-of-deduction critique of CLT.”).
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commercial law”263 and flexible statements of law (i.e.
standards) for “the social interest in the individual human
life and with individual claims to free self-assertion.”264 
Security of transactions in “the economic side of human
activity . . . call[s] for rule or conception authoritatively
prescribed in advance and mechanically applied.”265 In 
cases of “individual self-assertion . . . administrative justice 
is tolerable and that judicial justice must always involve a
large administrative element.”266 CLT had “insisted on one 
machine, [i.e. rules] set up with reference to the work to be 
done in one field, for all the work to be done in all fields.”267 
But the rule/standard dichotomy allows jurists “to 
rationalize the process of judicial decision for the purposes
of today.”268 Standards play a central role in Cardozo’s
jurisprudence.269 In his lecture series The Growth of the
Law,270 he speaks of standards as “capable of being
individualized to meet the needs of varying conditions”271 
and to be balanced with rules in “apportionment of the 
relative value of certainty on one side and justice on the 
other.”272 
In an article from 1928, Leon Green takes a nihilistic
view of standards, using negligence as an example.273 In a 
negligence case, the “pertinent factors . . . are beyond
classification and statement.”274 The possible combinations
263. Pound, supra note 1, at 956.
264. Id. at 957. See also supra, notes 162–65 and accompanying text.
265. Pound, supra note 1, at 957.
266. Id.
267. Id.
268. Id. at 958.
269. See supra notes 158–73 and accompanying text.
270. BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE GROWTH OF THE LAW (1924).
271. Id. at 82.
272. Id. at 83.
273. See Leon Green, The Negligence Issue, 37 YALE L.J. 1029, 1029 (1928).
274. Id. at 1029.
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of individuals’ personality and conduct are “literally
infinite, as infinite as space and time.”275 Instances of 
conduct are “beyond the limits of any catalog the law can
make.”276 Juries consider an array of factors not expressed
in the negligence standard including qualities and
characteristics of the parties, lawyers, and witnesses.277 
How a jury reaches its conclusion “is perhaps unknown
even to themselves.”278 There is no “table or key” provided
to the jury by the negligence standard; “[t]he law recites its
ritual and stops.”279 The judgment “is only the law’s
judgment in the particular case.”280 The law of negligence 
“defies the efforts of legal scientists to bring it under more 
definite control.”281 Green concludes in a final footnote, “[i]n 
other words, we may have a process for passing judgment in
negligence cases, but practically no ‘law of negligence’
beyond the process itself.”282 
Green’s article is nothing less than the Heisenberg
uncertainly principle of law. In the next few years the 
principle would be extended beyond standards to all law. In 
1931, Jerome Frank published a critique of the work of 
Pound and John Dickinson attacking the Pound division of 
law.283 Frank poses an eviction hypothetical and asks if 
275. Id.
276. Id. at 1029–30.
277. Id. at 1044 (Green’s list includes “[a]ge, sex, color, temperament,
indifference, courage, intelligence, power of observation, judgment, quickness of
reaction, self control, imagination, memory, deliberation, prejudices, experience,
health, education, ignorance, attractiveness, weakness, strength, poverty, and 
any of the other possible assortments . . .”).
278. Id. at 1043.
279. Id.
280. Id.
281. Id. at 1046–47.
282. Id. at 1047 n.37. See also LEON GREEN, RATIONALE OF PROXIMATE CAUSE 2 
(1927).
283. Jerome Frank, Are Judges Human? Part Two: As Through a Class
Darkly, 80 U. PA. L. REV. 233, 233 (1931).
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there a clear answer to the client’s question whether or not
the tenant will be evicted.284 “According to the Pound-
Dickinson notion, the answer is simple,” explains Frank,
“[y]our client’s rights are to be found in the well settled
rules relating to leases.”285 But this is misleading, argues
Frank.286 In a contested case there is as much uncertainty
in a court applying a rule as a standard. “Court
decisions . . . are functions of many unknown and
unknowable variables,” argues Frank, “the fact that only
one of the components is a constant [i.e. the rule] does not
sufficiently stabilize the ingredients to make possible 
stabilization of the decisions.”287 Even in cases involving
negotiable instruments, although promissory notes may be 
“precisely like another [and] although the rules governing
negotiability may be as rigid as a steel ingot,”288 the 
decisions are not certain. Frank bolsters his argument with
quotes from Law and the Modern Mind published the year
before:
Rules, whether stated by judges or others, whether in statutes,
opinions or text-books by learned authors, are not the Law, but are
only some among many of the sources to which judges go in
making the law of the cases tried before them . . . . There is no rule
by which you can force a judge to follow an old rule or by which
you can predict when he will verbalize his conclusion in the form of
a new rule, or by which he can determine when to consider a case
as an exception to an old rule, or by which he can make up his
mind whether to select one or another old rule to explain or guide 
his judgment. His decision is primary, the rules he may happen to
284. Id. at 233.
285. Id. (citing Part One of Frank’s article, Jerome Frank, Are Judges
Human? Part One: The Effect on Legal Thinking of the Assumption that Judges
Behave Like Human Beings, 80 U. PA. L. REV. 17 (1931)). John Dickinson
graduated from Harvard Law School in 1921, and held positions as Lecturer in 
the Department of Government at Harvard (1925–27), Assistant Professor of
Politics at Princeton (1927–29), and Professor of Law at the University of
Pennsylvania Law School (1929–48). See George L. Haskins, John Dickinson:
1894–1952, 101 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 4–6 (1952).
286. Frank, Are Judges Human? Part Two, supra note 283, at 234.
287. Id. at 234 (emphasis added).
288. Frank, Are Judges Human? Part One, supra note 285, at 36.
      
   
          
           
       
        
       
       
       
      
       
        
        
      
    
     
      
      
       
       
       
 
      
              
         
           
             
        
        
   
   
              
  
       
      
              
 
     
   
816 BUFFALO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 65
refer to are incidental.
The law, therefore, consists of decisions, not of rules. If so,
then whenever a judge decides a case he is making law.289 
Rule skepticism is a central theme for Llewellyn and he 
refers to Pound’s view that commercial law and property
provide certainty as “silly.”290 Pound often used the word
“precepts” to refer to both rules and standards.291 Llewellyn
argues that precepts are central to Pound’s thinking about
law and he is “partially caught in the traditional precept-
thinking of an age that is passing.”292 Precepts are “merely
verbal formulae”293 and it is misleading to think of “Rules
as Things.”294 In The Bramble Bush, Llewellyn writes of all
precedents as ambiguous, “Janus-faced”,295 and subject to 
interpretation “according to what may be the attitude of 
future judges.”296 On Philosophy in American Law297 
laments Pound’s “mere listing and description of our
apparently inconsistent jurisprudential trends in the latter
19th century”298 and never asking why. While we may have 
one system of precedent, “it works in forty different
ways.”299 In a speech on the Constitution to the Pacific
289. Id. at 40 (emphasis added).
290. K. N. Llewellyn, Through Title to Contract and a Bit Beyond, 15 N.Y.U.
L.Q. REV. 159, 174–75 n.24 (1938). Frank refers to Pound’s apportionment of
law into rigid rules and flexible standards as “delusive exactness.” FRANK, supra
note 239, at 226. In Law and the Modern Mind Frank devotes an entire
appendix to a critique of Pound. See id. at 312–26.
291. Llewellyn, supra note 254, at 434.
292. Id.
293. Id.
294. K. N. Llewellyn, On Warranty of Quality, and Society, 36 COLUM. L. REV.
699, 722 (1936).
295. LLEWELLYN, supra note 123, at 68.
296. Id. at 71 (emphasis omitted).
297. K. N. Llewellyn, On Philosophy in American Law, 82 U. PA. L. REV. 205 
(1934).
298. Id. at 205.
299. Id.
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Coast Institute of Law, Llewellyn contrasts words with 
practice, “[w]hen you are trying to find out what is the 
Constitution of the United States you look fundamentally to 
the practice of the government of the United
States . . . [a]nd if the practice does not square with the 
words of the Document, the words of the Document are 
dead.”300 When the Supreme Court refers to its
interpretations of the Constitution, “I think myself about
one time in ten they are interpretations; the other nine 
times they are acts of creative statesmanship, and have 
been since the time of Marshall.”301 
In 1931, Pound had published The Call for a Realist
Jurisprudence302 in a volume of the Harvard Law Review
celebrating Oliver Wendell Holmes’s ninetieth birthday.
Llewellyn considered the article an attack on realism. His
defense of the movement included Some Realism About
Realism—Responding to Dean Pound, which elaborates on
rule skepticism.303 Realists “[d]istrust . . . traditional rules
and concepts insofar as they purport to describe what either
courts or people are actually doing.”304 Innumerable factors
influence court decisions: the personality of the judge, the 
facts of the case, business practice and ideology, the skill of 
the attorneys, and so on.305 Rules are not “the heavily
operative factor.”306 
In The Hornbook Method and the Conflict of Laws,
Hessel Yntema deploys an approach that draws on
300. Karl N. Llewellyn, The Constitution as an Institution, 14 OR. L. REV.
108, 114 (1934–35).
301. Id. at 115.
302. Roscoe Pound, The Call for a Realist Jurisprudence, 44 HARV. L. REV.
697 (1931).
303. Llewellyn, supra note 11. For discussion of the exchange between Pound 
and Llewellyn, see HULL, supra note 11, at 190–222; TWINING, supra note 207,
at 72–73.
304. Llewellyn, supra note 11, at 1237.
305. Id. at 1242–47.
306. Id. at 1237.
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semiotics and evokes, to the contemporary mind, the 
“interpretative communities” theory of Stanley Fish307:
The history of codes and of legislation, or even of language, should
have taught us long since that rules and principles are empty
symbols which take on significance only to the extent that they are
informed with the social and professional traditions of a particular
time and place. Those who disbelieve may regard the manner in
which the greatest of our codes has been interpreted, the
Constitution of the United States. It is not the symbols but the
habits of thought that control interpretation and decision.308 
Judicial decisions are “emotive experience[s] in which
principles and logic play a secondary part . . . seem[ingly]
. . . like that of language, to describe the event which has
already transpired.”309 
In The Ethical Basis of Legal Criticism,310 Felix Cohen
creates a striking image of rule skepticism drawn from
geometry:
But elementary logic teaches us that every legal decision and
every finite set of decisions can be subsumed under an infinite 
number of different general rules, just as an infinite number of
different curves may be traced through any point or finite
collection of points. Every decision is a choice between different
rules which logically fit all past decisions but logically dictate
conflicting results in the instant case.311 
Cohen argues that legal decisions involve ethical
judgment, but “[o]ne looks in vain in legal treatises and law 
307. STANLEY FISH, DOING WHAT COMES NATURALLY: CHANGE, RHETORIC, AND 
THE PRACTICE OF THEORY IN LITERARY AND LEGAL STUDIES 141 (1989)
(explaining that an interpretative community is “a point of view or way of
organizing experience that shared individuals in the sense that its assumed
distinctions, categories of understanding, and stipulations of relevance and 
irrelevance were the content of the consciousness of community members . . .”); 
Yntema, supra note 192, at 479–80.
308. Yntema, supra note 192, at 479–80.
309. Id. at 480.
, 310. Felix Cohen, The Ethical Basis of Legal Criticism, 41 YALE L.J. 201
(1931–32).
311. Id. at 216.
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review articles for legal criticism conscious of its moral
presuppositions.”312 To logic “the difference between the 
names of the parties in the two decisions bulks as large as
the difference between care and negligence.”313 The essence 
of judging is not logic but making ethical decisions. Pound
has “put[] forward evolutionary schemes of legal history in
answer to strictly ethical questions . . . [but this] is
intellectually indefensible—however gratifying emotionally
it may be to feel that cheering for the winning side is the 
substance of morality.”314 
One of the consequences of “rule-worship,” to borrow a
phrase from Jerome Frank, is that it “conceals the prime 
importance of adequate fact-finding.”315 Several of the 
realists combined their rule skepticism with fact
skepticism. In a preface to the sixth printing of Law and the
Modern Mind,316 Frank describes those who join him in fact
skepticism:
Their primary interest is in the trial courts. No matter how precise
or definite may be the formal legal rules, say these fact skeptics,
no matter what the discoverable uniformities behind these formal
rules, nevertheless it is impossible, and will always be impossible,
because of the elusiveness of the facts on which decisions turn, to
predict future decisions in most (not all) lawsuits, not yet begun or
not yet tried.317 
In Frank’s view, not just a jury, but also a trial court
judge is unable to assess facts with certainty as he is a
312. Id. at 202.
313. Id. at 217.
314. Id. at 203 n.9.
315. Frank, Are Judges Human? Part Two, supra note 283, at 242.
316. Jerome Frank, Law And The Modern Mind (Anchor Books ed. 1963).
317. Id. at xi. Frank lists those who qualify in his judgment as fact skeptics,
“This group . . . includes, among others, Dean Leon Green, Max Radin,
Thurman Arnold, William O. Douglas (now Mr. Justice Douglas), and perhaps
E. M. Morgan.” Id.
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“fallible and variable witness of the witnesses.”318 CLT, the 
Progressive Era, and legal education are all guilty of 
focusing on appellate decisions, creating a misleading
picture of legal certainty and predictability. Cardozo, for
instance, paints a “relatively placid picture of the judicial
process” as he spent “most of his days [as] an appellate 
court lawyer or appellate court judge.”319 A trial is a 
dramatic event “full of interruptions, is turbulently
conducted, punctuated by constant clashes” while in the 
appellate court “those clashes appear only in reposeful,
silent, printed pages.”320 Cardozo, a victim of “appellate-
court-itis,” has written books completely focused on
appellate courts that “helped to distract public attention
from our tragically backward trial practices.”321 
With images drawn from geometry, Frank encapsulates
the differences between mere rule-skeptics and those who 
are both rule and fact-skeptics.322 Rule-skeptics live in an
artificial two-dimensional world, while rule and fact-
skeptics occupy a three-dimensional cosmos which is “out of 
sight, and therefore out of mind, in the rule skeptics’
cosmos.”323 
In a book review from the late 1930’s, Walter Wheeler
Cook, in discussing a contract issue, notes, “the complexity
in question is merely a reflection of the complexity of life 
itself.”324 Cook then draws an analogy between the 
complexity of the “legal universe” of the 1930’s and
quantum mechanics where the “data are so confusing and
new data are accumulating so fast that present day science 
has not yet succeeded in building a completely satisfactory
318. Frank, Are Judges Human? Part One, supra note 285, at 28.
319. FRANK, supra note 316, at xxix.
320. Id.
321. Id.
322. Id. at xi–xii.
323. Id.
324. Cook, supra note 189, at 514.
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picture.”325 To illustrate the point, he provides a list of 
subatomic particles from a then-recent essay in the 
magazine Science; “electrons, positrons, neutrons,
neutrinos, deuterons, mesotrons, and all the rest.”326 
Although not included in Frank’s list of fact-skeptics,
Llewellyn held a view of “facts” dramatically different from
Progressive Era thinking. In understanding rules in
operation, he drew attention not only to the importance of 
factual issues addressed in the rule, but also facts outside 
the rule. In a discussion of the absence of rescission for
breach of warranty in English law, for instance, he says
rescission “will not be understood in its operation until we 
learn how far the English retail trade has developed extra-
legal practice, akin to that of our department stores, of 
permitting return of goods by special clause or by
courtesy.”327 Furthermore, it is not only misleading when
we think of rules as things, but also when we “forget the 
tremendous extent to which the operation of any form of 
words depends upon some person’s classification of the facts
in cases.”328 In certain sale of goods transactions, for
instance, there are three possibilities: cases of conditional
acceptance, sale or return or sale on approval, and
financing agreements disguised as sales. Although “[t]he 
relevant contradictory legal categories are clear . . . nobody
knows what facts belong in which.”329 
Despite their skepticism, thinkers in the Realist Era
continued as members of law faculties, were appointed to 
positions in federal agencies, and served as judges. Perhaps
the best explanation of this apparent inconsistency is found
in a letter from Jerome Frank to Justice Felix Frankfurter.
Frankfurter wrote to Frank saying he was wrong in
325. Id.
326. Id. at 515 n.32.
327. Llewellyn, supra note 294, at 731.
328. Id. at 722.
329. Id. at n.76.
      
       
           
            
             
           
 
   
 
iii. Sociological Jurisprudence Unwilling to Examine Its
Assumptions
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thinking “most of the law is bunk.”330 Frank replied:
I don’t say that “most law is bunk.” You remember the farmer who
was asked if he believed in baptism and who replied, “Believe in
it? Hell I’ve seen it.” I think “law” is damned real. But I do not
believe that it works the way it appears, on the surface, to
work.331 
Non-Euclidean geometry and the work of 
mathematician Cassius Keyser were central to this critique 
of the Progressive Era. In Mr. Justice Holmes and Non-
Euclidean Legal Thinking, Jerome Frank sets out the 
parameters of the critique and credits Holmes with creating
non-Euclidean legal thought.332 Holmes’s bad man theory of 
law;333 his statement in The Path of the Law, “[t]he 
prophecies of what the courts will do in fact, and nothing
more pretentious, are what I mean by the law”;334 and his 
total rejection of theories of law based on general axioms of 
conduct provide a foundation for the critique. Sociological
jurisprudence was based on questionable postulates or
axioms, but it was “unwilling to examine [its] own
assumptions . . . ousting one set of sacred or tyrannical
axioms in order to install another such.”335 
Frank sets out the basic axioms of sociological
jurisprudence: a judge’s personality has little impact on
330. GLENNON, supra note 205, at 88.
331. Id. at 89.
332. Frank, supra note 214, at 572.
333. Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 459 
(1897). (“If you want to know the law and nothing else, you must look at it as a
bad man, who cares only for the material consequences which such knowledge
enables him to predict . . .”).
334. Id. at 461.
335. Frank, supra note 214, at 598. Frank directs his attack both on “[t]hose
who advocated the exclusively economic interpretation of all decisions” and
sociological jurists. Id.
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legal rights;336 the requirement that judges announce 
decisions in terms of legal rules protects against
arbitrariness;337 in litigation, the “Truth-Will-Out” axiom
protects against bias and mistakes;338 decisions are easily
criticized since the findings of facts are reported in the 
record;339 precise rules in commercial transactions make 
decisions predictable;340 clear rules prevent litigation;341 
decisions result from applying law to the facts;342 juries are 
better at finding facts and determining policies, but do not
decide cases;343 and upper courts are inherently better than
lower courts.344 Many of the axioms are drawn from Pound,
“who advance[s] no proof of the factual truth of these 
propositions.”345 Frank offers a list of alternative axioms
(e.g., “[t]he human element in the administration of justice
by judges is irrepressible.”346) and asks:
Try them out. See if they are not more accurate, more adequately
adjusted to what exists, to what occurs every day in court houses.
If they are, or as far as they are, they are true. Perhaps they are
false, or partly false. Perhaps there needs to be inserted in those
postulates such words as “sometimes” or “more often than not”, or
the like. They are suggested assumptions, tentatively formulated.
If they are more serviceable that the old assumptions, good; if not,
then away with them.347 
In Law and the Modern Mind, Frank analogizes the 
336. Id. at 579.
337. See id. at 580.
338. Id. at 587.
339. Id. at 588.
340. Id. at 590.
341. Id. at 592–93.
342. Id. at 593.
343. Id. at 595–96.
344. Id. at 597.
345. Id. at 580.
346. Id.
347. Id. at 581–82 (footnote omitted).
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Progressive Era thinker to a Piaget child:
[T]he child is singularly non-introspective. He has, according to
Piaget, no curiosity about the motives that guide his thinking. His
whole attitude towards his own thinking is the antitheses of any
introspective habit of watching himself think, of alertness in
detecting the motives which push him in the direction of any given 
conclusion. The child, that is, does not take his own motives into
account. They are ignored and never considered as a constituent of
thinking.348 
In the Realist Era critique, one of the consequences of 
the failure of Progressive Era thinkers to examine their
postulates is that they often asked meaningless questions.
In Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach,
Felix Cohen attacks opinions by Cardozo and Brandeis as
nonsense, as turning on questions identical in status to the 
theological question “How many angels can stand on the 
point of a needle?”349 In Tauza v. Susquehanna Coal Co,350 
the New York Court of Appeals faced the issue whether a
corporation chartered in Pennsylvania could be sued in New
York.351 Cohen views the issue as “thoroughly practical,”
implicating a factual inquiry into the difficulties to the 
plaintiff from denying jurisdiction, hardship to the 
defendant from defending actions in many states, and so 
on.352 Cardozo’s opinion discusses none of this—none of the 
“economic, sociological, political, or ethical questions.”353 
Instead the result turns on the question, “Where is a
corporation?”354 Cohen regards this question as
meaningless, as approaching the issue in supernatural
terms, since “[n]obody has ever seen a corporation” and it
348. FRANK, supra note 239, at 126.
349. Cohen, supra note 2, at 810.
350. 115 N.E. 915, 916 (N.Y. 1917).
351. Tauza, 115 N.E. at 915–16.
352. Cohen, supra note 2, at 810.
353. Id.
354. Id.
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would “thingify” a corporation to assume it travels from
state to state.355 
Cohen mounts a similar critique of Bank of America v.
Whitney Central National Bank,356 where the Supreme 
Court held that the defendant, a Louisiana banking
corporation, was not subject to suit in New York.357 An 
opinion by Brandeis, “the great protagonist of sociological
jurisprudence,”358 takes a similarly transcendental
approach: “[t]hat the defendant was not in New York and,
hence, was not found within the district is clear.”359 The 
authors and the readers of such opinions are “apt to forget
the social forces which mold the law and the social ideals by
which the law is to be judged.”360 The opinions, indeed the 
thought of many courts and legal scholars, are “trapezing
around in cycles and epicycles without coming to rest on the 
floor of verifiable fact.”361 
In the spring of 1935, Llewellyn launched a research
project into dispute resolution among the Cheyenne 
Indians. He had the wisdom to work with an anthropologist
(E. Adamson Hoebel) who would become coauthor of The 
Cheyenne Way,362 a landmark in the anthropological study
of the law of indigenous tribes.363 Llewellyn’s prior work
had discussed the dangers of the observer effect:
355. Id. at 811.
356. 261 U.S. 171 (1923).
357. Id. at 171.
358. Cohen, supra note 2, at 811.
359. Bank of Am., 261 U.S. at 173.
360. Cohen, supra note 2, at 812.
361. Id. at 814.
362. KARL N. LLEWELLYN & E. ADAMSON HOEBEL, THE CHEYENNE WAY:
CONFLICT AND CASE LAW IN PRIMITIVE JURISPRUDENCE (1941).
363. See, e.g. TWINING, supra note 207, at 111. For a discussion of The
Cheyenne Way, see generally id. at 153–69.
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“[e]thnographers have discovered that the ethical
preconceptions of the missionary darkened his observation
of simpler cultures”;364 “to classify is to disturb”; and 
“categories and concepts . . . tend . . . both to suggest the 
presence of corresponding data when these data are not in
fact present, and to twist any fresh observation of data into 
conformity with the terms of the categories.”365 In The 
Cheyenne Way, Llewellyn devotes an entire chapter to 
methodology.366 He allowed Hoebel to conduct the majority
of the fieldwork while Llewellyn provides the theoretical
framework for the project.367 Llewellyn is explicit in
explaining the reasons for his careful explanation of the 
methodology:
The best one can do is to try to make his own conceptual structure
somewhat explicit, so that the reader may be warned by it . . . . 
But our own approach to the material requires to be set out.
General theory guides inquiry. It conditions not only
interpretation but recording. It conditions the very seeing of the
data. It also lends data their significance. The data react upon it,
in turn, and remodel it; but that merely means that they are then
presented in the frame of a more adequate conceptual framework,
and so with a modified significance.368 
In correspondence between Llewellyn and Pound,
Llewellyn charges Pound with insensitivity to the observer
effect. In Llewellyn’s view, Pound’s history of jurisprudence 
was ahistorical, writes N. E. H. Hull, as he “imposed a
design of conscious causal processes on what was
undoubtedly an unconscious practical evolution.”369 
364. KARL N. LLEWELLYN, Legal Tradition and Social Science Method – A 
Realist’s Critique, reprinted in KARL N. LLEWELLYN, JURISPRUDENCE: REALISM IN 
THEORY AND PRACTICE 84 (1962). The essay was originally published in 1931 by 
the Brookings Institution. Id. at 77.
365. Llewellyn, supra note 254, at 453.
366. LLEWELLYN & HOEBEL, supra note 362, at viii.
367. Id.; TWINING, supra note 207, at 155.
368. LLEWELLYN & HOEBEL, supra note 362, at 19.
369. HULL, supra note 11, at 146.
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Others in the Realist Era cautioned against the 
observer effect. Frank’s fact skepticism was based, in part,
on the “inherently subjective nature of the so-called facts of 
any ‘contested case.’”370 Cook warns that initial
assumptions provide a template for selecting data, “what
one does not expect to see he either does not see, or, if he 
‘sees’ it at all, he passes it over in silence as unimportant or
irrelevant.”371 One of the most profound discussions of the 
consequences of the observer effect is found in Morris
Cohen’s The Basis of Contract.372 CLT had deployed a
public law / private law dichotomy to sort substantive areas
within law (e.g. contract law was private while criminal law
was public) and logically derive results in particular cases
(e.g. in Lochner v. New York,373 the state must lose since it
had violated the employer’s constitutionally protected
“private” right to freely contract with its employees).374 
Cohen argues the dichotomy was imposed on the cases in
the process of the construction of CLT. Cohen collapses the 
public/private distinction by reframing the issue. If a
contract is “generally devoid of all public interest,” he asks,
“why enforce it?”375 He maintains that contract is an
important public institution because the state is involved in
enforcement, interpretation, supplementing the language of 
the agreement, and so on.376 “From this point of view,” he 
concludes, “the law of contract may be viewed as a
370. Frank, supra note 214, at 598.
371. Cook, supra note 189, at 514.
372. Morris R. Cohen, The Basis of Contract, 46 HARV. L. REV. 553 (1933).
373. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
374. For discussions of Lochner v. New York as a reflection of CLT’s
deployment of the will theory and its view that public and private occupy
different spheres, with parties exercising powers “absolute within their spheres” 
see KENNEDY, supra note 4, at 8–16; Nyquist, supra note 10, at 426–27; supra
notes 25–26 and accompanying text.
375. Cohen, supra note 372, at 562.
376. Id. at 586.
      
    
        
    
v. Deriving Law From Studying Society or From an
Intuition About Society’s Goals
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subsidiary branch of public law.”377 
Sociological jurisprudence argued law should be 
founded either on a study of society’s ills or a legal
scientist’s intuition about a policy goal. Pound celebrates
social workers who have “accumulated a mass of data and
have developed methods and technique[s] which the lawyer
must study and must learn how to utilize.”378 He calls for
universities to organize their departments of law, arts, and
philosophy to provide “research in preparation for
legislation.”379 In an article from 1912, Pound anchors his
view of legal progress in a quotation from a journal of 
sociology: “[e]very beneficent change in legislation comes
from a fresh study of social conditions and of social ends,
and from some rejection of obsolete law to make room for a
rule which fits the new facts.”380 
An illustration of an intuition-based policy is found in
Hohfeld’s discussion of the negotiability principle (the 
power of a transferor of property to deliver an interest
greater than her own):
Such powers are created by the law on various grounds of policy
and convenience,—the teleology underlying each particular
instance not being difficult to discover. In this place a bare
enumeration of some of such powers must suffice: 1. The power of
sale in market overt to a bona fide purchaser; 2. The power of even 
a thief having possession of money but not, of course, the
“ownership” thereof, to create a good title in a bona fide
“purchaser” . . . . The foregoing and others that might be
mentioned are cases depending on the public policy of securing
freedom of alienation and circulation of property in the business
377. Id. at 586. For a brief history of the public/private dichotomy, see
Duncan Kennedy, The Stages of Decline of the Public/Private Distinction, 130
U. PA. L. REV. 1349 (1982).
378. Roscoe Pound, Law and Social Work, 3 IND. L.J. 183, 193 (1927).
379. Id. at 194.
380. Roscoe Pound, The Scope and Purpose of Sociological Jurisprudence Part
III, 25 HARV. L. REV. 489, 507 n.73 (1912).
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world.381 
Notice how the legal principle (negotiability) is logically
derived from the policy goal (securing freedom of alienation
and circulation of property).
The Progressive Era view that law could be logically
derived from a policy goal is a central theme throughout the 
Era. “Pound was forever neatly fitting rules to situations,”
observes Duncan Kennedy, “through a straightforward
identification of single purposes.”382 In his 1924 lectures,
Cardozo cites the opinions of Justice Brandeis as “an
impressive lesson in the capacity of law to refresh itself 
from external sources . . . contemporary conditions, social,
industrial, and political, of the community affected.”383 
Cardozo illustrates legal progress “in obedience to the 
promptings of a social need”384 by pointing to the change 
from riparian rights to appropriation rights in the water
law of western states. The appropriation rule reflects a
policy of encouraging beneficial use of water resources. The 
Realist Era critique emphasized conflict between policies.
Logically deriving law from one policy completely ignores
the conflicting policy.
The Realist Era mounted its critique on two fronts. The 
Progressive Era failed to separate their views of what is
from their views of what ought to be (the Is/Ought critique).
Second, the Progressive Era failed to acknowledge 
conflicting counter-policies (e.g. protection of the bona fide
purchaser in a negotiability case is in direct conflict with
protection of the original owner).
The Is/Ought critique is an application of Realist Era
sensitivity to the observer effect.385 Felix Cohen accuses
381. Hohfeld, Judicial Reasoning, supra note 53, at 756–57.
382. Kennedy, supra note 185, at 120.
383. CARDOZO, supra note 270, at 117.
384. Id. at 119.
385. This critique is often discussed in the secondary literature although it is
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Dickinson of “confus[ing] normative and descriptive 
science”386 and Frank states the postulates of sociological
jurisprudence are a “confused mixture of (a) ‘There should
be;’ and (b) ‘There is.’”387 “Pound and Dickinson are 
confusing the desirable and the existent,” comments Frank,
“They slide back and forth (without being aware of it) from
stating ‘what I would like to see happen in the future’ to 
‘what is now happening.’”388 Llewellyn complains about the 
“fusion or confusion of the realms of Is and Ought”389 and 
argues for the “temporary divorce” of Is and Ought,390 citing
the “more accurate description of Is”391 as a hallmark of 
realism.
III. BALANCING 
The concept of balancing dates at least to Blackstone392 
but in American courts balancing was not deployed
generally until the 1930’s.393 Although there are radical
differences between teleological balancing and conflicting
considerations, balancing is permeated with “endless
ambiguity”394 and for many, balancing equals teleological
seldom linked to the observer effect. See, e.g., Kennedy, supra note 185, at 121 
n.91 (“Pound’s generation of an ‘ought’ from an ‘is’ is . . . common to pragmatism
and institutional economics in their early stages, as well as to sociological
jurisprudence . . . . A major realist complaint against sociological jurisprudence
was its blurring of the fact/value distinction.”)
386. Cohen, supra note 310, at 204 n.12.
387. Frank, supra note 214, at 584.
388. Id.
389. LLEWELLYN, supra note 364, at 84.
390. Llewellyn, supra note 11, at 1254.
391. Id. at 1255.
392. See e.g. DANIEL J. BOORSTIN, THE MYSTERIOUS SCIENCE OF THE LAW 97
(1941).
393. For a history of balancing in American constitutional cases, see T.
Alexander Aleinikoff, Constitutional Law in the Age of Balancing, 96 YALE L.J.
943, 948–54 (1987).
394. Pauline Westerman, Interview met Duncan Kennedy, 3 NEDERLANDS
TIJDSCHRIFT VOOR RECHTSFILOSOFIE & RECHTSTHEORIE [NETH. J. LEGAL PHIL.]
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balancing with conflicting considerations only dimly
understood. One of the goals of this Article is to bring
clarity to the issue. In the literature, the fragments that
would be used to construct our two views of balancing can
be ferreted out in the Realist Era. This Part traces a
genealogy of balancing—it is not a history. Traditional
history tends to focus on origins, linear development of 
ideas, and searches for the “root of what we know and what
we are.”395 Genealogy focuses on accident, singularity, and 
disparity instead of identity, and sees that essences, if any,
were “fabricated in a piecemeal fashion from alien
forms.”396 Duncan Kennedy’s work on legal consciousness is
an apt illustration of a genealogy: “We study the history of a
consciousness by the genealogical method . . . looking not
for origins, but for the pre-existing elements that actors
combine at moments of change to produce a new version
of . . . consciousness.”397 
A force field approach to picturing balancing clarifies
the difference between teleological balancing and conflicting
considerations. The image of both types is a field
constructed by courts with opposed interests positioned at
either end (marked “+” and “-”). Courts draw a line in the 
field based on a statute or case law, and particular cases,
depending on the outcome, are positioned by courts on one 
side of the line or the other. A judge can change the 
outcome by moving a case from one side to the other. As an 
example, consider the 1935 case Webb v. McGowin.398 The 
plaintiff suffered grievous injuries in the process of saving
the defendant’s life by diverting the fall of a heavy wooden
258, 264–65 (2004) (“The critics of formalism . . . were ambivalent as to whether
to replace formalism with a teleological jurisprudence or with a jurisprudence of
proportionality. In both European and American legal thought there is endless
ambiguity about this.” ).
395. FOUCAULT, supra note 3, at 81.
396. Id. at 78.
397. KENNEDY, supra note 19, at 202.
398. 168 So. 196 (Ala. Ct. App. 1935).
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block.399 In gratitude, defendant promised to pay the 
plaintiff $15 every two weeks for the remainder of plaintiff’s
life.400 The defendant made the payments for almost ten
years, but, upon his death his estate discontinued the 
payments.401 The suit was brought in assumpsit. Applying a 
force field approach to the opinion, the case involves a
conflict between the policies supporting promise 
enforcement (the morality of promise performance, the 
fairness of paying for benefits received, and so on) versus
the policies supporting non-enforcement (people should be 
able to change their minds, promises made under extreme 
circumstances may be inconsiderate, and so on). In 1935,
consideration theory and promissory estoppel (the only
promise enforcement mechanisms available) drew a line in
the field separating liability from non-liability. The court
clearly felt enormous sympathy for the plaintiff but was
faced with facts that seemed to position the case on the non-
liability side. The court moved the case to the liability side 
by characterizing the defendant’s promise as “an affirmance 
or ratification of what [the] appellant had done raising the 
presumption that the services had been rendered at
McGowin’s request.”402 In other words, it became a contract
consideration case because the court was willing to reshape 
the facts into a bargain.403 
Teleological balancing is objective, either/or, purposive,
and filled with confidence that balancing leads to a correct
result. The familiar image of the scales of justice supports
399. Id. at 196.
400. Id. at 197.
401. Id.
402. Id. at 198.
403. Id. The court treats the case as if, at the moment when the plaintiff is in
the process of dropping the wooden block (which is done in the usual and
ordinary course of his employment), and notices the defendant standing
beneath, he shouts “if I divert the fall of this block, saving your life, and I’m
horribly injured, do you promise to pay me $15 every other week for the rest of
my life?” In reply the defendant shouts “yes” and then the plaintiff falls. See id. 
at 196–99.
    
         
        
       
        
 
     
 
 
     
  
     
        
       
       
     
      
    
  
     
     
     
      
    
 
             
        
         
        
            
         
       
8332017] GENEALOGY OF BALANCING
notions that a court decides a case by placing the weight of 
each interest on the scales and the result settles the matter.
The loser’s interest retreats and harmony is restored.
“Force Field A” is an image of teleological balancing, seen in
Figure 1.404 
FIGURE 1. Force Field A (Teleological Balancing)
Notice how the competing interests operate only up to 
the line with no overlap.
In contrast, conflicting considerations balancing sees
interests as perennially in conflict. The defeated interest is
not neutralized but survives to fight another day.
Conflicting considerations views law as contingent and
mutable; made and not found. The operation of the 
conflicting policies throughout the field is the critical 
difference between conflicting considerations and
teleological balancing.405 
Applying a conflicting considerations understanding of 
policy to the negotiability principle in Article 3 of the 
Uniform Commercial Code, imagine a case where a
purchaser of a promissory note sues the maker. The maker
raises a failure of consideration defense (the widgets were 
404. For further discussion of a force field approach to policy see DUNCAN 
KENNEDY, Freedom and Constraint in Adjudication: A Critical Phenomenology,
in LEGAL REASONING: COLLECTED ESSAYS 11, at 36–41, 44–50 (2008); Curtis
Nyquist, A Force Field Approach to Policy, 13 LAW TCHR. 1, 12–13 (2005).
405. Duncan Kennedy has been the principal architect of our understanding
of conflicting considerations. See KENNEDY, supra note 10, at 99–100; Kennedy,
supra note 185, at 94–96, 104–05, 108–15.
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defective) while the plaintiff claims holder in due course 
(HIDC) status. The force field looks like that shown in
Figure 2.
FIGURE 2. Force Field B (Conflicting Considerations
Balancing)
The policies in support of the HIDC (encouraging
markets in negotiable instruments including maximizing
the price purchasers are willing to pay) are represented by
“+” while “-” represents the policies in support of the 
maker’s defense (ensuring sellers deliver a quality product
and the unfairness of forcing buyers to pay for shoddy
goods). The conflicting policies operate throughout the 
field.406 The line in the field is the Article 3 rule regarding
personal defenses (i.e., a HIDC takes free of personal
defenses while a non-HIDC takes subject).407 In cases to the 
left of the line, the plaintiff has failed to establish HIDC
status and, therefore, the defense prevails. In cases to the 
right, the plaintiff is a HIDC and takes free of the defense.
Pound and Holmes serve as patriarchs of the divergent
views of balancing. Pound’s approach was formulated early
in his career and became a mantra he repeated for more 
than forty years: “the satisfaction of everyone’s wants so far
406. See KENNEDY, supra note 404, at 39 (“[W]e have to add to our model of
the field of law the notion that, at every point in the field, contradictory policies
exert different levels of force.”).
407. U.C.C. § 3-305 (2014).
    
        
       
      
    
      
      
          
       
     
     
      
      
  
           
       
          
        
            
         
           
           
         
        
      
     
 
             
           
   
         
        
           
   
           
     
   
     
          
         
8352017] GENEALOGY OF BALANCING
as they are not outweighed by others’ wants.”408 In the 
Realist Era, Pound’s view would be influential in the 
genealogy of teleological balancing. For Pound, balancing
was about “reasonable adjustment,” “rational
reconciling,”409 and interests being “harmonized or
compromised.”410 In the inventory of social interests, “first
place must be given to . . . general security,”411 and Pound
cites the negotiability principle as a reflection of “how far
recognition of the social interest in the security of 
transactions went in the maturity of law.”412 
Holmes was an early prophet of conflicting
considerations. A premonition of the path he would follow
dates to the 1870’s:
Two widely different cases suggest a general distinction, which is a
clear one when stated broadly. But as new cases cluster around
the opposite poles, and begin to approach each other, the
distinction becomes more difficult to trace; the determinations are
made one way or the other on a very slight preponderance of
feeling, rather than articulate reason; and at last a mathematical 
line is arrived at by the contact of contrary decisions, which is so
far arbitrary that it might equally well have been drawn a little
further to the one side or to the other.413 
In articles from the 1890’s, Holmes elaborates on his
view of policy: “a line must be drawn between the 
conflicting interests”;414 “[t]he two advantages run against
408. Pound, supra note 66, at 612. In 1954 he wrote “I am content with a 
picture of satisfying as much of the whole body of human wants as we may with 
the least sacrifice.” ROSCOE POUND, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF
LAW 47 (1954). See also supra note 1 and accompanying text; infra text 
accompanying note 451. Others in the Progressive Era would cite Pound’s
refrain as a fundamental principle of the Era. See, e.g. CARDOZO, supra note
177, at 55.
409. Roscoe Pound, A Survey of Social Interests, 57 HARV. L. REV. 1, 4 (1943).
410. Id. at 17.
411. Id.
412. Id. at 20.
413. Holmes, The Theory of Torts, 7 AM. L. REV. 652, 654 (1873).
414. Holmes, Privilege, supra note 36, at 3.
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one another, and a line has to be drawn”;415 “[v]iews of 
policy . . . are fields of battle”;416 “[i]t is a question of degree 
at what point the combination becomes large enough to be 
wrong”;417 “judges themselves have failed adequately to 
recognize their duty of weighing considerations of social
advantage”;418 “[s]uch matters really are battle grounds
where the means do not exist for determinations that shall
be good for all time”; and “[b]ehind the logical form lies a
judgment as to the relative worth and importance of 
competing legislative grounds.”419 
In Hudson County Water Company v. Robert H.
McCarter,420 Holmes creates a striking image of conflicting
considerations:
All rights tend to declare themselves absolute to their logical
extreme. Yet all in fact are limited by the neighborhood of
principles of policy which are other than those on which the
particular right is founded, and which become strong enough to
hold their own when a certain point is reached. The limits set to
property by other public interests present themselves as a branch 
of what is called the police power of the State. The boundary at
which the conflicting interests balance cannot be determined by
any general formula in advance, but points in the line, or helping
to establish it, are fixed by decisions that this or that concrete case
falls on the nearer or farther side. 421 
Realist Era views of the two forms of balancing were 
not necessarily either/or, as demonstrated by the work of 
both Morris Cohen and John Dickinson. Cohen and
Dickinson come down primarily on the teleological side422 
but they also have something to contribute to conflicting
415. Id. at 6.
416. Id. at 7.
417. Id. at 8.
418. Holmes, supra note 333, at 467.
419. Id. at 466.
420. 209 U.S. 349 (1908).
421. Id. at 355.
422. See infra notes 428, 447–50 and accompanying text.
    
     
       
      
        
       
    
  
      
        
       
        
     
      
       
     
        
       
         
    
     
         
     
       
        
       
      
      
        
 
       
        
      
     
        
             
         
              
         
8372017] GENEALOGY OF BALANCING
considerations.423 Furthermore, no one in the Realist Era
offers a fully developed theory of conflicting considerations
but rather, in the process of critiquing the Progressive Era
and teleological balancing, they offer fragments as they
groped toward a new understanding of balancing. Years
later, the fragments would be used to assemble the 
contemporary theory.
One of the dynamics was a spirit of collaboration as
ideas were shared, argued about, and accepted, rejected, or
transformed. For example, Llewellyn says of Morris Cohen,
“his insistence on a phenomenon in law akin to ‘fields’ of 
force and strain-in-a-given-direction in physics, advanced
the ball here.”424 Llewellyn is referring to Cohen’s “principle 
of polarity” which Cohen introduces in Reason and
Nature.425 Cohen describes the principle as opposites (e.g., 
unity and plurality, ideal and real) working in tandem like 
two blades of a scissors: “Both are necessary and intimately
connected, but neither can absorb or, by a process of 
sublimation (Aufhebung), transcend the other.”426 Any 
attempt to separate the two must fail since “[i]n actual life 
real freedom to do anything, in art as in politics, depends
upon acceptance of the rules of our enterprise.”427 Cohen’s
principle was sufficiently murky that it would be subject to 
various interpretations and it did not necessarily lead to 
conflicting considerations, as it would in the work of 
Llewellyn and Felix Cohen. Roscoe Pound saw the principle 
of polarity as contributing to the spread of natural law.428 
Peter Read Teachout argues the principle would act as the
423. See infra notes 424–26, 466–67 and accompanying text.
424. Llewellyn, supra note 257, at 602.
425. MORRIS R. COHEN, REASON AND NATURE (1931).
426. Id. at 385.
427. Cohen, supra note 372, at 591.
428. Roscoe Pound, Fifty Years of Jurisprudence (pt. 3), 51 HARV. L. REV. 444, 
471 n.84 (1938) (“See also for America, the ethical-rationalist natural law of
Morris R. Cohen . . . . [i]f we are to have a fundamental principle, Professor
Cohen’s ‘principle of polarity’ would satisfy me very well.”).
      
   
      
     
    
     
        
         
       
      
     
      
      
     
        
      
     
      
      
  
 
               
    
        
      
 
   
      
           
           
    
      
      
            
    
     
     
838 BUFFALO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 65
organizing principle of Fuller’s jurisprudence.429 
A genealogy of teleological balancing and conflicting
considerations finds all of the elements of each type 
surfacing in the Realist Era.
A. A Genealogy of Teleological Balancing 
Teleological balancing grew out of the Progressive Era
concern that legal principles should reflect goals and
purposes either logically derived from a study of society or
based on intuition.430 In a discussion of the social
utilitarians, Pound refers to the work of Rudolph von
Jehring as “of enduring value for sociological
jurisprudence”431 and characterizes Jehring’s philosophy as
teleological: “[s]ince life is governed by purpose, he held
that the science of collective life must employ primarily a
teleological method.”432 For Jehring, law should be based on
the search for human ends and once those ends are 
discovered, they should be “fashioned consciously into 
laws.”433 When Progressive Era thinkers noticed conflicting
policies, they assumed a teleological, purposive balancing
would resolve the conflict.
429. See Peter Read Teachout, The Soul of the Fugue: An Essay on Reading
Fuller, 70 MINN. L. REV. 1073, 1082, 1105–12 (1986).
430. See supra notes 378–84 and accompanying text. G. Edward White’s
summary of Sociological Jurisprudence provides further context for teleological
balancing:
[Progressive Jurisprudence’s] philosophical premises—the inevitability
of change, ultimate confidence in the ability of governmental
mechanisms to respond to change . . . a belief in the violability of
common social ends and shared moral values, and a faith that moral
and ethical “rights” could be perceived and distinguished from
“wrongs”—were those of Progressivism at large.
White, supra note 212, at 1024.
431. Roscoe Pound, The Scope and Purpose of Sociological Jurisprudence (pt.
2), 25 HARV. L. REV. 140, 146 (1911).
432. Id. at 140.
433. Id. at 141.
    
     
        
      
       
       
             
        
      
     
     
        
      
        
       
      
      
      
         
          
     
       
       
       
 
        
   
     
       
       
          
      
     
         
              
        
   
       
     
8392017] GENEALOGY OF BALANCING
In his lectures, Cardozo emphasizes the teleological
basis of law and teleological balancing.434 In 1924 he notes,
“some philosophy of the end to be served by tightening or
enlarging the circle of rights and remedies, is at the root of 
any decision in novel situations”435 and “all methods are to 
be viewed not as idols but as tools . . . [t]hus viewing them
we shall often find that they are not antagonists but
allies.”436 Cardozo’s 1928 The Paradoxes of Legal Science
contains a veritable library of teleological balancing
concepts: “values of expediency or of convenience or of 
economic or cultural achievement . . . are to be ascertained
and assessed and equilibrated”;437 in “the task of 
judging . . . [w]e seem to see the workings of an Hegelian
philosophy of history”;438 and “gaps in the system will be 
filled, and filled with ever-growing consciousness of the 
implications of the process, by a balancing of social
interests.”439 In judging, Cardozo laments the difficult case,
but “[t]hen, suddenly, the fog has lifted. I have reached a
stage of mental peace . . . . All the more precious is the final
peace for the storm that went before it.”440 
Brandeis fashions an early statement of a balancing
test in an opinion from 1918. The Chicago Board of Trade 
had promulgated a rule prohibiting “call” trades of grain
434. See CARDOZO, supra note 270, at 102.
435. Id.
436. Id. at 103.
437. CARDOZO, supra note 177, at 54.
438. Id. at 62. Hegel’s philosophy purported to discern a direction and 
purpose in the flux of history. Apparent contradictions are seen as thesis and 
antithesis which are ultimately resolved in a synthesis. See, e.g., CHARLES
TAYLOR, HEGEL AND MODERN SOCIETY 56–66, 65 (1979) (“[I]n his introductory 
lectures to the Philosophy of History, Hegel speaks of the principles ‘that
Reason rules the world’ and that the final purpose of the world is the
actualization of freedom, as having to be presupposed in the study of history,
but as having been ‘proved in philosophy.’”).
439. CARDOZO, supra note 177, at 77.
440. Id. at 80–81.
      
      
      
      
     
    
     
     
     
      
         
            
         
         
          
          
   
      
     
       
         
    
         
        
        
        
 
               
           
            
   
     
      
     
     
              
            
        
       
840 BUFFALO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 65
during certain hours of the day. 441 The Department of 
Justice filed suit alleging the rule violated the Sherman
Act.442 The District Court excluded evidence offered by the 
Board of Trade about the purposes of the rule and enjoined
enforcement of the rule.443 The Supreme Court reversed,
holding the evidence should have been admitted and
finding that the rule was a “reasonable regulation of 
business consistent with the provisions of the Anti-Trust
Law.”444 Brandeis spells out the test to be applied:
To determine that question the court must ordinarily consider the
facts peculiar to the business to which the restraint is applied; its
condition before and after the restraint was imposed; the nature of
the restraint and its effect, actual or probable. The history of the
restraint, the evil believed to exist, the reason for adopting the
particular remedy, the purpose or end sought to be attained, are
all relevant facts.445 
Although much maligned, Brandeis’s balancing test,
known as the “Rule of Reason,” still dominates anti-trust 
jurisprudence.446 Brandeis provides only a rough sketch of 
how balancing should work, but his view is entirely
consistent with teleological balancing.
John Dickinson’s work reflects the view that a need for
balancing arises not from a perennial conflict between
interests, but from changes in society. Were society static,
law would be certain and unchanging “[b]ut the difficulty is
441. Bd. of Trade of Chicago v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 236 (1918).
Chicago Board of Trade “call” trades occurred during special sessions following
the close of the regular trading day. Id. The special sessions generally lasted
about 30 minutes. Id.
442. Id. at 232–33.
443. See id. at 231.
444. Id. at 239.
445. Id. at 238.
446. See, e.g., Maurice Stucke, Discussion: Does the Rule of Reason Violate the
Rule of Law?, 22 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 28, 30 (2009) (“The rule of reason has
been criticized for being inaccurate, its poor administrability, its subjectivity, its
lack of transparency, and its yielding inconsistent results.”).
    
       
      
         
         
      
     
         
        
       
      
     
      
  
         
          
            
         
        
        
         
             
          
 
     
 
      
    
             
        
               
            
 
       
              
 
       
        
8412017] GENEALOGY OF BALANCING
that the contemporary view of public policy shifts with
successive generations, and what was once the goal of policy
ceases in time to be so.”447 Since law is “a system of abstract
logic, it spreads a net of allaying oil over the controversies
of the moment.”448 Dickinson pictures balancing as a
process “of drawing a line somewhere between two opposing
general principles and saying that each shall be valid only
up to the line and that beyond it the other shall prevail.”449 
If Dickinson were to draw his view of balancing it would
undoubtedly look like Force Field A in Figure 1.450 
The concluding paragraph of Pound’s 1943 A Survey of 
Social Interests may be seen as the archetypal statement of 
teleological balancing:
Such in outline are the social interests which are recognized or are
coming to be recognized in modern law. Looked at functionally, the
law is an attempt to satisfy, to reconcile, to harmonize, to adjust
these overlapping and often conflicting claims and demands, either
through securing them directly or immediately, or through
securing certain individual interests, or through delimitations or
compromises of individual interests, so as to give effect to the
greatest total of interests or to the interests that weigh most in our
civilization, with the least sacrifice of the scheme of interests as a
whole.451 
B. A Genealogy of Conflicting Considerations Balancing 
While the Progressive Era assumed a harmony view of 
447. JOHN DICKINSON, ADMINISTRATIVE JUSTICE AND THE SUPREMACY OF LAW IN 
THE UNITED STATES 131 (1927) [hereinafter DICKINSON, ADMINISTRATIVE 
JUSTICE]. See also John Dickinson, The Law Behind Law (pt. 1), 29 COLUM. L.
REV. 113, 132 (1929) (“The customary theory of law breaks down in a complex
society . . . . There is therefore continually raised for the law the problem of
selecting between those customs which it will ratify and those which it will
not.”).
448. DICKINSON, ADMINISTRATIVE JUSTICE, supra note 447, at 141.
449. John Dickinson, The Law Behind Law (pt. 2), 29 COLUM. L. REV. 285,
299 (1929).
450. See supra note 404 and accompanying text.
451. Pound, supra note 409, at 39.
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society, conflicting considerations views society as
fragmented. Felix Cohen argues that the idea that the goal
of law “is simply to secure adequate enforcement for the 
expressed demands of society . . . derives from a dangerous
metaphor.”452 He adds: “Society is not vocal. The expressed
demands of society are the demands of vocally organized
groups, and a discreet deference to the power of such groups
should not lead us to confuse their demands with ‘social
”453welfare.’ In Walter Wheeler Cook’s call for a different
type of law school, one of the aims was the study not just of 
society’s goals but “research into the conflicts of interest
which arise in the community.”454 Laissez faire economic
theory viewed the wants of the community as being
satisfied under a democratic approach with voting in
dollars. “But what is ‘the community’ whose wants are thus
satisfied?” asks Robert Hale, “[i]t is not a single sentient
being, but a name given to various individuals who have 
wants.”455 
A teleological view of balancing is peaceful; balancing
spreads an “allaying oil” over conflict. The language of 
conflicting considerations is violent; “[s]uch matters really
are battle grounds,”456 “taking sides upon debatable and
often burning questions”457 like “[s]hall we have war?”458 
“clashing human rights . . . on pitched fields,”459 and in 
international relations and industrial relations “we find
452. Cohen, supra note 310, at 207 n.20.
453. Id.
454. Cook, supra note 223, at 309.
455. Robert L. Hale, Coercion and Distribution in a Supposedly Non-Coercive
State, 38 POL. SCI. Q. 470, 490–91 (1923).
456. Holmes, supra note 333, at 466.
457. Id. at 468.
458. LLEWELLYN, supra note 123, at 116.
459. Joseph C. Hutcheson, Jr., Lawyer’s Law and the Little, Small Dice, 7 
TUL. L. REV. 1, 4 (1932).
    
    
      
        
        
       
      
         
    
      
     
    
     
           
             
         
          
             
       
         
 
        
        
       
  
    
        
    
       
          
       
 
        
            
 
       
          
     
         
8432017] GENEALOGY OF BALANCING
[the] war of all against all.”460 
The Progressive Era held the view that the need for
balancing was caused by changes in society. Conflicting
considerations regards balancing as arising from a collision
between interests that is fundamental and perennial. An 
unpublished 1934 manuscript by George Gardner, included
in Lon Fuller’s 1947 edition of Basic Contract Law, captures
the spirit of conflicting considerations.461 He summarizes
the four elementary ideas of contract (tort, bargain,
promise, and quasi-contract), sorts the ideas into two 
categories (justice known before the event versus justice 
known after the event), and concludes:
These ideas, which at first seem trite and wholly harmonious, are
in fact profoundly in conflict . . . . The conflict between these two
standpoints is perennial; it can be traced throughout the history of
the law of contracts and noted in nearly every debatable contract 
question; there is no reason to think that it can ever be gotten rid
of or to suppose that the present compromises of the issue will be 
any more permanent than the other compromises that have gone
before.462 
Felix Cohen urges judges not to be fooled by general
concepts that lead only to circular reasoning, but instead to 
“assess the conflicting human values that are opposed in
every controversy.”463 
Under conflicting considerations, force fields are 
dynamic and courts are seen as actively involved in
constructing the fields, drawing the line of demarcation,
and positioning cases in the field. “Creative legal thought,”
argues Felix Cohen, “will . . . seek to map the hidden
springs of judicial decision and to weigh the social forces
460. Cohen, supra note 2, at 837.
461. George K. Gardner, Observations on the Course in Contracts (1934)
(unpublished).
462. LON L. FULLER, BASIC CONTRACT LAW 151 (1964) (quoting GARDNER,
supra note 461). For further discussion of Gardner’s remarks, see Kennedy,
supra note 185, at 166.
463. Cohen, supra note 2, at 842 (emphasis added).
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which are represented on the bench . . . ‘[s]ocial policy’ will
be comprehended . . . as the gravitational field that gives
weight to any rule or precedent.”464 In an article from 1937,
Felix Cohen elaborates on his view of force fields, writing,
“conflicting interests [are] diversely organi[z]ed and pitted
against each other in an ever shifting battle line.”465 Morris
Cohen observes that issues of the rights of property owners
and economic freedom “argue[] for a regime where every
one has a definite sphere of rights and duties, but it does
not tell us where these lines should be drawn.”466 In a later
article, Morris Cohen draws an analogy between law and
geometry. Results in particular cases are points while a
series of cases create a line: “No point by itself can
determine the position of a line completely; for many lines
can be passed through it.”467 Llewellyn’s article on warranty
of quality, after emphasizing the importance of “some
person’s classification of the facts in cases,”468 discusses how
the legal concepts of warranty are often arrayed on
“opposing pole[s]”469 and lawyers’ arguments are really
“combat between systems.”470 Judges and lawyers have a
sense of how cases are positioned and can be repositioned
within the force field. Cases nearer the poles are seen as
“easier” than cases nearer the line dividing the outcomes.
464. Id. at 833–34.
465. Felix S. Cohen, The Problems of a Functional Jurisprudence, 1 MOD. L.
REV. 5, 22 (1937). For a similar idea in the work of John Dickinson, see
Dickinson supra note 449, at 302–03 (Rejecting the idea that it is possible to
generalize particular policy judgments into a coherent system: “A later case
arising on a different state of facts may thus be validly decided on a completely
contradictory presupposition. ‘A case is only authority for what it decides,’ said
Lord Halsbury.” Id. at 303 (footnote omitted)).
466. Morris R. Cohen, Property and Sovereignty, 13 CORNELL L. Q. 8, 19 
(1927).
467. Morris R. Cohen, Justice Holmes and the Nature of Law, 31 COLUM. L.
REV. 352, 364 (1931).
468. Llewellyn, supra note 294, at 722 (emphasis in original).
469. Id. at 728.
470. Id. at 730.
    
         
       
      
     
       
       
         
     
      
       
    
           
            
             
           
         
       
    
      
     
        
      
     
       
  
 
              
           
          
           
            
  
        
   
         
        
             
         
        
8452017] GENEALOGY OF BALANCING
All of this, of course, exists only in the minds of judges and
lawyers—force fields are not “out there” in any sense.
Under conflicting considerations, each policy operates
throughout the field, not just up to the line of 
demarcation.471 In Law and the Modern Mind, Frank
critiques Pound’s division of human conduct and economic
conduct.472 Not only is Pound’s division irrational, but when
he attempts to balance them it becomes apparent “these 
two phrases are not antithetical but hopelessly overlap.”473 
French law Professor René Demogue speaks to the point in
a work from 1916:
In the opposition which ideas cause to arise at a given moment,
the law of simplicity of the mind discloses a conflict bound to end
in the death of the vanquished. This is an error . . . . [R]ejected
ideas must retake, sooner or later, a part of their lost ground;
whence comes that satisfaction, to a certain extent, of
contradictory desires which is completed by illusion and hope.474 
Under conflicting considerations, cases are particular 
and resist general categorization. Holmes stressed the 
importance of particularity. “When the question of policy is
faced it will be seen to be one which cannot be answered by
generalities,” he comments, “but must be determined by the 
particular character of the case.”475 Herman Oliphant cites
the empiricism of physical sciences as a model to counteract
the speculative thinking of social science where we have 
471. One of the few contemporary works on the history of balancing hints at
this idea, but when the point is raised it is quickly dropped. See Aleinikoff,
supra note 393, at 946 (“The Court employs a different version of balancing
when it speaks of ‘striking a balance’ between or among competing
interests . . . . One interest does not override another; each survives and is given 
its due.”).
472. See FRANK, supra note 239, at 212.
473. Id.
474. René Demogue, Analysis of Fundamental Notions, in MODERN FRENCH
LEGAL PHILOSOPHY 345 at 567–68 (Mrs. Franklin W. Scott & Joseph P.
Chamberlain trans., 1916). Kennedy refers to Demogue as one of the founders of
conflicting considerations. See Kennedy, supra note 185, at 113.
475. Holmes, Privilege, supra note 36, at 3.
      
      
    
        
   
         
      
         
        
      
       
       
      
     
     
      
      
       
       
       
      
        
    
         
      
 
         
   
   
        
        
        
           
 
     
               
          
 
           
846 BUFFALO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 65
become accustomed to “handling drafts on thought of rather
large denominations.”476 “[T]he experimental physicist or
chemist, who does not spend his days worrying about the 
absence of ultimate and absolute rational structures,” he 
elaborates, “but who sees that his and many lifetimes will
be occupied on investigations markedly particular.”477 Leon
Green states a jury’s judgment in a negligence case “is only
the law’s judgment in the particular case; it has no further
currency.”478 Underhill Moore’s analysis of group habits,
including the habits of legal institutions, argues that “each
institution is a complex aggregate of many specific group
habits” and general concepts like property are “simply
generic names for aggregates of minute channels of 
conduct.”479 In balancing social values the value to be 
preferred, observes Edwin Patterson, “can only be 
determined in particular, not in general.”480 
In a stunning 1950 retrospective look at the Realist
Era, Felix Cohen integrates force field theory and
physics.481 In discussing the common law system he applies
the “guiding thread in Einstein’s general theory of 
relativity” and finds that just as matter warps the “space-
time structure,”482 so too “the force and direction of a
precedent vary with the field in which it is observed.”483 To 
illustrate, he hypothesizes a “series of precedents that
476. Herman Oliphant, Facts, Opinions, and Value-Judgments, 10 TEX. L.
REV. 127, 136 (1932).
477. Id.
478. Green, supra note 273, at 1043.
479. Moore, supra note 17, at 613.
480. Patterson, supra note 243, at 144.
481. Felix S. Cohen, Field Theory and Judicial Logic, 59 YALE L.J. 238 
(1950).
482. Id. at 250.
483. Id. at 249. Cohen argues that there are many and varied “value regions”
and as a component of law (i.e. relevant facts, rules, precedents) moves to a
different region, it “changes its weight, its shape, and its direction in accordance
with ‘the lay of the geodesics’ of the region.” Id. at 250.
    
      
      
           
        
     
         
          
      
       
    
    
       
      
      
       
     
      
       
        
      
       
    
           
            
 
     
     
     
       
         
          
              
      
           
     
      
8472017] GENEALOGY OF BALANCING
shows a straight line when the judgments range from
$1,000 to $100,000” and argues that the line “may
swerve . . . sharply when a case involves a twenty million
dollar judgment against a government or other public
institution.”484 Furthermore, “the shape of a precedent, as
well as its size, will vary with the selectivity-grid through
which it is viewed” so that cases in a series “which look[] 
like a straight line from one value standpoint may look like 
a very crooked stick from another.”485 Just as in physics,
where the idea of absolute space has become antiquated, so 
too “[t]he absolute space of unchanging rules and unmoving
precedents . . . [of] traditional jurisprudence is gone.”486 
After more than sixty years, jurisprudential force field
theory has yet to address Cohen’s insights.
IV. CONCLUSION 
Philosopher David Wood emphasizes an idea he calls
the “step back.”487 When concepts become too familiar, we 
stop thinking about them; we reduce them to “something
that we’ve known all along.”488 Wood encourages us to step
back from the familiar to develop new ways of seeing. Wood
participated in the 2000 Collegium Phenomenologicum, a
colloquium on Martin Heidegger’s Beitrage. His reflection
on the experience illustrates the step back:
[W]e spent three weeks in Italy trying to make sense of this book, 
and also, I think it would be fair to say, trying not to make sense of
484. Id. at 249.
485. Id. at 248.
486. Id. at 250.
487. DAVID WOOD, THE STEP BACK: ETHICS AND POLITICS AFTER
DECONSTRUCTION (2005). Wood is a professor of philosophy at Vanderbilt
University. Although his philosophical training was in the British analytic
tradition much of his work is in the continental tradition. He has written on
Jacques Derrida, Martin Heidegger, and Emmanuel Levinas among others.
488. Darren Hutchinson, Thinking Against the Grain: An Interview with
David Wood, VAND. PHILOSOPHY DEP’T (Fall 2000), https://as.vanderbilt.edu
/philosophy/people/faculty/davidwoodinterview.php (last visited Mar. 15, 2016).
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it, that is trying to keep it at a certain distance, trying to allow it
to continue to work on us. Because, of course, the temptation in
reading the book, or any book, even the Beitrage, is to come out at
the end of the day saying, “This is what it’s about,” and to the
extent that I’ve done that I may have mislead you. And the real
trick, in some sense, is to keep it intact, keep it operating at a
distance.489 
Wood encourages us to retreat “from the fantasy of a
‘final solution’ . . . [and] the seemingly attractive idea of 
reaching an end, never having to struggle again.”490 He 
finds the step back concept at work in philosophy, the arts,
and many other disciplines.491 A painting can be more than
just an object hanging on a wall; “sometimes you get the 
sense that the painting itself looks out onto the world, that
the painting is not just in the world but it actually opens up
a world. It reveals a whole way of thinking and seeing and
experiencing.”492 We are constantly tempted to look for easy
answers, but as Wittgenstein comments, “[w]e want to 
walk: so we need friction. Back to the rough ground.”493 
The goal of this Article is to encourage us to take a step
back from the conventional history of American legal
thought and from our established view of balancing. The 
hope is that these two areas will be made unfamiliar, new,
and interesting; so that “we don’t quite know what to say;
we haven’t got all the concepts ready made.”494 
The traditional account of American legal thought
divides the period from 1870 to 1941 into two eras:
Classical Legal Thought from 1870 to the 1920’s and a
Progressive/Legal Realist critique of CLT from the 1920’s to 
1941. This Article complicates and enriches that story by
489. Id. at 5–6.
490. WOOD, supra note 487, at 7.
491. Hutchinson, supra note 488.
492. Id.
493. LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS § 107, at 46e (G.
E. M. Anscombe trans. 2d ed. 1958) quoted in WOOD, supra note 487, at 1.
494. Hutchinson, supra note 488.
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claiming there were three eras; CLT from 1870 to the 
1920’s, a Progressive Era from 1905 to 1923, and a Realist
Era from 1923 to 1941. This three era approach has several
consequences. It provides a more accurate historical
account of the Realist Era. Reading Realist Era scholarship
demands careful attention to the target of critique: is it 
CLT, or the Progressive Era, or both? It multiplies the 
number of available theories of law which undermines the 
possibility of any of them being ultimately persuasive.495 
And it acknowledges the enormous debt the Realist Era
owes to cognitive relativism in science, social science, and
the arts.
Similarly, our view of balancing is too facile with
teleological balancing being the default setting: conflicting
considerations is rarely discussed in the literature or even
seen as an alternative. Like Pound we always know what to 
say about balancing but find ourselves unable to say
anything new. Conflicting considerations is one of the most
significant innovations of the Realist Era and there is a
danger that it will be lost to history.
Recognition of the two radically different forms of 
balancing opens up new ways of thinking and seeing. For
example, Martha Nussbaum discusses the insight from
Greek tragedy that life often offers choices where even a
good person has no alternative but to inflict harm.496 She 
uses a scene in Aeschylus’s Agamemnon to illustrate her
point.497 Agamemnon’s fleet is becalmed and he learns in a
prophetic utterance that the winds will not return until he 
495. See e.g., KENNEDY, supra note 10, at 82 (discussing the
critique/reconstruction structure of American legal theory which has been
embedded in our scholarship since the Progressive Era with the consequence 
that the critique side is so fully developed that many weapons are available to
attack any attempt at reconstruction which then “sinks like a stone”).
496. MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, THE FRAGILITY OF GOODNESS: LUCK AND ETHICS IN
GREEK TRAGEDY AND PHILOSOPHY 25 (2001) (“Tragedy . . . shows good people
doing bad things, things otherwise repugnant to their ethical character and
commitments, because of circumstances whose origin does not lie with them.”).
497. Id. at 32.
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sacrifices his daughter.498 In weighing the decision he 
realizes that if he does not sacrifice her, everyone on the 
voyage, including her, will perish.499 As Agamemnon
decides to make the sacrifice, the Chorus criticizes him not
for the decision, but for his attitude toward the decision.500 
He displays neither regret nor remorse; he “did not struggle 
against it.”501 Although at first he is horrified at the 
thought of sacrificing his daughter “[f]rom the moment he 
makes his decision, itself the best he could have made, he
strangely turns himself into a collaborator, a willing
victim.”502 Philosophy from its earliest days has denied the 
existence of such conflicts and there is a long tradition
purporting to offer an escape from the dilemma. In 
Euthyphro, Socrates argues that the idea of competing
moral claims is illogical.503 In R.M. Hare’s philosophy, when
two general rules appear to conflict, create an exception.504 
Or, as in Kant’s philosophy, it is argued that “it is part of 
the very notion of a moral rule or principle that it can never
conflict with another.505 
Joseph Singer elaborates on the consequences of 
Nussbaum’s insight for jurisprudence. In the divide 
between liberal theories of law (i.e. legal process, rights
theory, and law and economics) and critical theories (i.e.
critical legal studies, feminist legal theory, and law and
society), it is critical theory that avoids falling back into 
formalism:
498. Id. at 33.
499. Id.
500. Id. at 35–36.
501. Id. at 36.
502. Id. at 35.
503. Id. at 25.
504. Id. at 31 (R.M. Hare argues that “inconsistent principles . . . must [be]
modif[ied]. . . in the light of the recalcitrant situation.” In a time of war with
lives at stake, “‘[d]on’t lie’, is reformulated . . . as the more adequate principle,
‘[d]on’t lie, except to the enemy in time of war.’”).
505. Id.
    
      
        
         
          
       
        
            
  
      
        
     
     
 
   
     
       
       
     
     
        
         
      
      
  
        
     
     
        
        
         
         
         
 
           
 
   
       
       
8512017] GENEALOGY OF BALANCING
[Critical theory] sees decision procedures as illegitimate attempts
to evade responsibility for moral choices about justice, and is
skeptical about the possibility of identifying a single common
viewpoint from which claims of justice may be judged. Moreover, it
sees the elaboration of contradictory principles, value, and
perspectives as itself a constructive part of normative argument.
Contradiction all the way down is the route to a responsible, moral
formulation of social justice.506 
Just as Greek tragedy “depicted people who were placed
in situations in which they were pulled, morally, in two 
different directions,” judges should recognize they face 
“hard choices in the face of contradictory moral
impulses.”507 
The Nussbaum/Singer understanding of tragedy
captures an essential difference between teleological
balancing and conflicting considerations. A judge applying a
teleological view of balancing can slip easily into formalism,
separating herself from the result, thinking that the rule 
decides the case and since the opposed policies occupy
different regions in the force field, a decision one way or the 
other does not inflict harm.508 A judge with a conflicting
considerations understanding of policy realizes, as each
opposed policy operates throughout the field,509 she has no 
choice but to impose harm.
In Realist Era scholarship there is a clear recognition of 
the consequences of conflicting considerations for judges.
Once again Holmes is at the forefront:
I cannot but believe that if the training of lawyers led them
habitually to consider more definitely and explicitly the social
advantage on which the rule they lay down must be justified, they
sometimes would hesitate where now they are confident, and see
that really they were taking sides upon debatable and often
506. Joseph William Singer, Legal Realism Now, 76 CAL. L. REV. 465, 537 
(1988).
507. Id.
508. See supra note 404 and accompanying text.
509. See supra notes 405–07 and accompanying text.
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burning questions.510 
Felix Cohen argues that “every case presents a moral
question to the court” and the classical theory “hides from
judicial eyes the ethical character of every judicial question,
and thus serves to perpetuate class prejudices and
uncritical moral assumptions.”511 A theory of the judge’s
role, which Cohen calls the “slot machine doctrine,” while it
might provide “aid and comfort” to judges deciding difficult
cases, distances judges from the ethical consequences of 
their decisions.512 Morris Cohen argues that abstract
theories of law and the application of empty phrases like 
“liberty of contract” to justify a decision operate “to the 
detriment of any thorough-going analysis of the actual
social situation.”513 
Jerome Frank admits the judge’s role “if well done, is no 
simple one.”514 Judges must balance conflicting interests,
determine if a case should be controlled by an old rule or
“‘legislate’ by revising and adjusting the preexisting rules,”
and when explaining the decision, judges “need all the clear
consciousness of their purpose which they can summon to 
their aid.”515 Frank summarizes both the temptations
facing judges and the opportunity offered them:
[T]he pretense, the self-delusion, that when they are creating they
are borrowing, when they are making something new they are
merely applying the commands given them by some existing
external authority, cannot but diminish their efficiency. They must
rid themselves of this reliance on a non-existent guide, they must
learn the virtue, the power and the practical worth of self-
510. Holmes, supra note 333, at 468.
511. Cohen, supra note 2, at 840.
512. Felix S. Cohen, Modern Ethics and the Law, 4 BROOK. L. REV. 33, 35 
(1934–35).
513. Cohen, supra note 467, at 354.
514. FRANK, supra note 239, at 130.
515. Id.
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authority.516  
For a contemporary example of conflicting 
considerations consider Sullivan v. United Dealers Corp.517 
The Sullivans entered into a contract with Memory Swift
Homes, Inc. for construction of a prefabricated home and in
payment, issued a promissory note to Memory Swift in the 
amount $18,224.64.518 Memory Swift then transferred the 
note to United Dealers.519 After making a few monthly
payments the Sullivans defaulted on the note claiming the 
construction was defective.520 United sued for enforcement
of the note and the trial court found that since United
qualified as a holder in due course, the Sullivans were 
obligated to pay despite the defective construction.521 The 
appellate court affirmed although there were strong
arguments for the Sullivans.522 The court emphasized the 
policies in support of holder in due course status (e.g., “. . . 
to encourage the supplying of credit . . . by insulating the 
lender from lawsuits over . . . quality.”) but did not mention
the conflicting policies (e.g., forcing the defendant to pay for
shoddy construction which will undermine the quality of 
construction in the industry).523 Overlaying the facts of 
516. Id. at 130–31.
517. 486 S.W.2d 699 (Ky. Ct. App. 1972).
518. Id. at 700.
519. Id.
520. Id.
521. Id. at 701.
522. Id. (“[T]estimony shows that the appellee [the finance company] was
cognizant and knew about this contract. The appellee had done around
$500,000 with Memory Swift Homes, Inc., over a period of . . . years . . . [and] 
also knew at the time they purchased th[e] note and mortgage no work had
been performed.”).
523. Id. Sullivan is just one of many pre-1976 cases where consumers’ claims
or defenses were cut off by the purchaser’s holder in due course status. A
Federal Trade Commission regulation effective May 14, 1976 required that any 
consumer credit contract with a seller of goods or services contain a notice
stating any holder of the contract is subject to claims and defenses “which the
debtor could assert against the seller of goods or services.” See F.T.C.
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Sullivan onto Force Field B in Figure 2, it seems the court
views the case as close to the line but positioned on the 
positive side. The harm is inflicted on the Sullivans who 
were undoubtedly stunned to learn of the intricacies of 
Article 3 of the Uniform Commercial Code. It would be 
relatively easy to move the case to the other side inflicting
the harm on United. For example, the court could have held
that because of the volume of business between Memory
Swift and United they were too closely connected. Under
the “close connection” doctrine United would be considered
a co-originator of the note and therefore subject to the 
Sullivan’s defense.524 
The stark difference between teleological balancing and
conflicting considerations raises in a profound way the more 
general question of a judge’s role and her responsibility in
deciding cases. David Wood describes responsibility in its
most fundamental sense as the ability to respond to a
situation. In the philosophy of Husserl, for example, 
“responsibility . . . is . . . not particularly ethical, or
epistemological, or metaphysical . . . [It is] a condition for
any of these things to have any kind of value.”525 The court
in Sullivan v. United Dealers, to the extent it thought about
balancing, probably held a teleological view. Had it instead
understood the case as raising conflicting considerations
with policies colliding throughout the field, it would not
have justified the result with a glib reference to the holder
in due course policy. Perhaps the outcome would have been
the same but the court would have struggled with the 
decision, realizing it had no choice but to inflict harm.
Joseph Singer summarizes the essence of responsible 
Consumer-Credit Regulations, 16 C.F.R. § 433.2(a) (2015). This regulation
changes the result in Sullivan. It is worth noting, however, that if the Sullivans’
contract had been for construction of a commercial building or if the Sullivans 
had issued a check, the regulation would not apply.
524. For an example of a case applying the close connection doctrine, see
Jones v. Approved Bancredit Corp., 256 A.2d 739 (Del. 1969).
525. Hutchinson, supra note 488.
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decision making: “[t]he better response is to recognize the 
competing moral claims, to feel them pressing upon you at
the moment you act.”526 
Applying conflicting considerations to an issue with
more gravitas than the U.C.C., from 1995 to 2002 Colorado 
law mandated sentencing in capital cases by a three-judge 
panel. Judge Leland Anderson, now retired, sat on two such
cases voting in favor of the death penalty in one and against
in the other.527 He reflects on the experience:
Those cases continue to haunt me even to this day, many years
after having signed off on the decisions with a trembling heart. In
the interim, I have struggled emotionally and morally with the
issue of the death penalty. I know these decisions remain with one
the rest of one’s life . . . . This is a wounding experience.”528 
Judge Anderson sounds like a good person torn between
alternatives where either of the options would inflict harm
and who brought to the cases a deep sense of responsibility.
The death penalty is a “burning question”529 and Judge 
Anderson displays his wounds openly and candidly. Holmes
would approve.
526. Singer, supra note 506, at 538.
527. Leland Anderson, Abandon the Death Penalty, Retired Judge Urges,
DENVER POST (Mar. 7, 2013, 3:02 PM) http://blogs.denverpost.com/opinion
/2013/03/07/abandon-the-death-penalty-retired-judge-urges.
528. Id.
529. See supra note 510 and accompanying text.
